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REVISITING THE USE/REGULATION 
DISTINCTION TO REFORM LIABILITY AND 
COMPENSATION UNDER INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 
Jonathan Bonnitcha and Emma Aisbett* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A network of over three thousand treaties governs international invest-
ment. These investment treaties share remarkable similarities in their struc-
ture and core provisions.
1
 They provide foreign investments with a suite of 
legal protections from adverse conduct by “host” states in which they in-
vest.
2
 If a foreign investor believes that the host state has breached these 
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 1. See generally RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2d ed. 2012); JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N. 
SKOVGAARD POULSEN & MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT 
TREATY REGIME (2017). Consistently with the existing literature, our definition of ‘invest-
ment treaty’ includes bilateral investment treaties, plurilateral investment treaties, see, for ex-
ample, Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M 360, and the investment chapters of 
multi-issue free trade agreements. See, e.g., Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, ch. 9, Mar. 8, 2018 [hereinafter CPTPP], https://www.dfat.gov.au
/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/Pages/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-
pacific-partnership. 
 2. A growing minority of investment treaties also include provisions that require host 
states to remove restrictions/limitations on incoming foreign investment—i.e. investment lib-
eralization provisions. In this article, we do not address issues raised by these provisions. For 
consideration of some of the issues raised by the interaction between investment protection 
and investment liberalization provisions, see Emma Aisbett, Larry Karp & Carol McAusland, 
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treaty protections, it can bring a claim against that state to international arbi-
tration. This mechanism for adjudication of claims under investment treaties 
is popularly known as investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”). If the in-
vestor is successful, the arbitral tribunal will require the host state to com-
pensate the investor. These awards of compensation can be enforced inter-
nationally through associated regimes for the recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral awards.
3
Once an obscure corner of international law familiar to only a handful 
of specialists, investment treaties are now among the most controversial in-
struments of international economic governance. States, including the archi-
tects of the existing regime, are now reconsidering their participation in 
such treaties.
4
Two related features of investment treaties have proven par-
ticularly controversial. First, critics contend that investment treaties allow 
foreign investors to challenge legitimate and justifiable regulatory changes.
5
Philip Morris’ challenge to the introduction of tobacco plain packaging in 
Compensation for Regulatory Taking in International Investment Agreements: Implications of 
National Treatment and Rights to Invest, 1 J. GLOB. & DEV. 1–3 (2010).
3. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270; 575 
U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966); Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Arbitral Awards, opened for signature Jun. 10, 1958, 3 U.S.T. 2517, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38 (1958).
4. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, for example, has criticized investor-
state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) provisions in investment treaties. See In His Own Words: 
Lighthizer Lets Loose on Business, Hill Opposition to ISDS, Sunset Clause, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Oct. 19, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/trade/his-own-words-lighthizer-lets-loose-
business-hill-opposition-isds-sunset-clause. The transition from the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) to the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”)
has since removed the U.S.-Canada investment relationship from the coverage of ISDS. Com-
pare North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289, 
with United States of America, the United Mexican States and Canada Agreement, Off. U.S. 
Trade Representative (July 1, 2020) [hereinafter USMCA], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements
/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between. In May 
2020, twenty-three European Union (“EU”) Member States signed a treaty to terminate intra-
EU bilateral investment treaties. EU Member States Sign an Agreement for the Termination of 
Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties, EUR. COMM’N (May 5, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu
/info/files/200505-bilateral-investment-treaties-agreement_en. However, the EU continues to 
pursue investment treaties with other states. More generally, there is currently a multilateral 
process underway within United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) Working Group III for the reform of the investment treaty regime. See infra 
Part VI. See generally Status of Preparatory Work on Reform Options and Schedule of 
Events—Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, U.N. COMM’N ON 
INT’L TRADE L. (May 14, 2020), https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state.
5. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment 
Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 353, 379 (2015); Lorenzo Cotula, Do Investment Treaties 
Unduly Constrain Regulatory Space? 9 QUESTIONS INT’L. L. 19, 19–20 (2014); David 
Gaukrodger, The Balance Between Investor Protection and the Right to Regulate in Invest-
ment Treaties: A Scoping Paper (Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. (“OECD”) Working Papers on 
Int’l Inv. No. 2, 2017).
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Australia and Vattenfall’s challenge to the phase-out of nuclear power gen-
eration in Germany are high profile examples. Second, critics contend that 
outsized awards of compensation place too great a burden on public financ-
es, particularly in developing countries.
6
For example, in the recent case of 
Tethyan Copper v. Pakistan, Pakistan was required to pay $5.9 billion U.S. 
Dollars to a Canadian mining company for failing to issue a mining lease 
required for the development of a planned copper mine to go ahead.
7
Alt-
hough the mine was never built, compensation in that case was based on the 
mine’s projected income over its entire fifty-year operating cycle if it had 
been allowed to go ahead. This award of compensation was almost as large 
as the bailout that Pakistan and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)
had negotiated two months earlier to save the Pakistani economy from col-
lapse.
8
Many states have responded to the first of these concerns through revi-
sions to their treaty practice.
9
To date, however, revisions to investment 
treaties’ substantive provisions have been largely reactive and incremental, 
in the sense that they seek to exclude particularly controversial provisions, 
or interpretations of provisions, found in earlier generations of treaties.
10
These changes have not been linked to any underlying account of the eco-
nomic rationale for granting internationalized legal protections to foreign 
investment, or to any assessment of investment treaties’ effectiveness in 
6. A 2018 UNCTAD study found that the average amount of compensation awarded 
was $504 million U.S. Dollars (“USD”), although the median award was significantly lower 
at $20 million U.S. Dollars (“USD”), reflecting the impact of several very large awards on the 
average. See generally U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 95
(2018). For a more recent compilation of all award over $100 million USD, see JONATHAN 
BONNITCHA & SARAH BREWIN, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., COMPENSATION 
UNDER INVESTMENT TREATIES 1, 29–31 (2019).
7. Jeffrey Sachs, How World Bank Arbitrators Mugged Pakistan, PROJECT 
SYNDICATE (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/world-bank-
corrupt-arbitration-ruling-against-pakistan-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2019-11.
8. The bailout, negotiated in May 2019, was reported as providing a $6 billion USD in 
funds to Pakistan. See Salman Masood, Pakistan to Accept $6 Billion Bailout from I.M.F., 
N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/12/world/asia/pakistan-imf-
bailout.html.
9. See generally REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY 
REGIME (Andreas Kulick ed., 2016).
10. For example, the carve-out of tobacco control measures from the scope of ISDS 
under the CPTPP. See CPTPP, supra note 1. Another example is the European Union’s clari-
fication of the fair and equitable treatment standard in article 8.10(2) of the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union and its Member 
States. See generally EU-Canada: Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement, EUR.
COMM’N [hereinafter CETA], http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ as discussed in 
Caroline Henckels, Protecting Regulatory Autonomy Through Greater Precision in Invest-
ment Treaties: The TPP, CETA, and TTIP, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 27, 35–40 (2016). For a more 
systematic analysis of these dynamics, see Wolfgang Alschner, The Impact of Investment Ar-
bitration on Investment Treaty Design: Myth Versus Reality, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 35–36
(2016).
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achieving their policy objectives. Surprisingly little attention has been given 
to the second of these concerns—that is, the principles governing compen-
sation under investment treaties.
11
In this context, we pose the following two questions in a companion 
paper:
12
i. In what circumstances should an investment treaty require 
a host state to pay compensation for interference with for-
eign investment?
ii. In such circumstances, how much compensation should be 
required?
Although legal scholars tend to deal with these questions separately, we 
show that they are intimately connected and should be dealt with together. 
Using the tools of law and economics, we show that investment treaties are 
likely to generate mutual benefits for host states and foreign investors to the 
extent that they discipline opportunistic conduct by host states. We argue 
that investment treaties should not constrain state’s ability to respond to new 
information or to change their policy priorities. Our specific proposal is that 
a state should only have to compensate the investor if it breaches or modi-
fies the domestic legal regime governing the investment, and that compen-
sation should be the lesser of the investor’s loss and the host state’s gain 
from the host’s state not having had the new legal regime in place when the 
investment was made.
13
Key practical implications of our proposal are that states should not be 
required to compensate investors in many of the circumstances that are 
compensable under existing investment treaty jurisprudence and that, inso-
far as compensation is required, the amount of compensation will ordinarily 
be less than is currently the case. Another distinguishing feature of our pro-
posal is that it does not require arbitral tribunals to weigh or balance com-
peting interests in order to determine whether compensation is required or, 
insofar as compensation is required, to determine the amount that should be
paid. This is a sharp break with existing investment treaty jurisprudence, 
which relies heavily on balancing as a mode of arbitral reasoning,
14
and also 
11. Cf. Diane A. Desierto, The Outer Limits of Adequate Reparations for Breaches of 
Non-Expropriation Investment Treaty Provisions: Choice and Proportionality in Chorzów, 55
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 395 (2017); Steven Ratner, Compensation for Expropriations in a 
World of Investment Treaties: Beyond the Lawful/Unlawful Distinction, 111 AM. J. INT. L. 7, 
20–21 (2017).
12. Emma Aisbett & Jonathan Bonnitcha, A Pareto-Improving Compensation Rule for 
Investment Treaties 24 J. INT’L ECON. L. 181 (2021).
13. This proposal draws on a set of concepts—notably, the concept of “the domestic 
legal regime”—that are defined precisely in our companion paper. In Part II of this paper, we 
recall the definitions of these concepts. In Part IV, we show how these concepts could be op-
erationalized in investment arbitration as a practical matter.
14. See infra Part IV.
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a point of contrast with other prominent proposals for reform.
15
The title of 
this article reflects this feature of our proposal.
16
In this article, we situate our proposal in relation to existing academic 
debates, explore its implications in practice and consider additional policy 
arguments for our proposal beyond the criterion of Pareto improvement de-
ployed in our companion paper.
17
The article is organized as follows. Part II 
provides an overview of the rationale for our proposal, as set out in our 
companion paper. It also recalls the definitions of key concepts from our 
companion paper and, in doing so, clarifies the series of questions a tribunal 
would have to answer to apply our approach in practice.
Having briefly revisited the arguments of our companion paper in Part
II, Parts III-VI comprise the original contribution of this article. Part III sit-
uates our proposal within long-standing academic debates about the extent 
to which private property should be protected from adverse government ac-
tion. We show that legal scholarship on the protection of private property 
from government interference can be divided into two broad traditions. The 
first tradition maintains that, to determine whether government interference 
with property requires compensation, a court or tribunal should balance the 
investor’s interests against countervailing public interests that might justify 
the interference. The second tradition posits that a court or tribunal should 
distinguish government “use” (or appropriation) of property from govern-
ment regulation of property, with only the former requiring compensation. 
According to this tradition, the capacity in which the government is acting, 
rather than weighing and balancing competing interests, determines a dis-
tinction between the use and regulation of private property. Our proposal 
falls squarely within this second tradition. However, scholarship within this 
tradition faces challenges of its own—notably, the difficulty in distinguish-
ing between government “use” and “regulation” of property in complex cas-
es.
Part IV explains how our proposal relates to the rules and principles 
governing liability and compensation under existing investment treaties. We 
use a series of well-known cases as examples to illustrate the implications. 
15. See, e.g., VALENTINA VADI, PROPORTIONALITY, REASONABLENESS AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 263–65 
(2018) (arguing for a more careful calibration of existing balancing techniques).
16. To be clear, we are contrasting our proposal to alternatives in which arbitral tribu-
nals are required to engage in balancing as a mode of reasoning in order to come to a decision 
in the case before them. The concept of balance might also be understood in a different, wider 
sense. Because legal regimes impact upon different interests, changes to the design of any le-
gal regime might be said to have implications for the balance that regime strikes between in-
terests. Our proposal does not obviate the need to consider how investment treaties affect di-
verse interests in this sense; indeed, our companion paper makes a sustained argument for 
why our proposal should be preferred on this basis. We are grateful to David Gaukrodger for 
encouraging us to clarify this point.
17. Aisbett & Bonnitcha, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing Pareto improvement and de-
fining it as occurring when at least one party is left better off and no party is left worse off).
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In the course of this exposition, we show that our proposal builds on con-
cepts and approaches that have been implemented in other legal regimes. 
For example, our approach to compensation is similar to the calculation of 
compensation based on restitution and reliance in contract law. In pointing
to these similarities, we seek to pre-empt concerns that our proposal in-
volves too radical a shift from current jurisprudence. By combining these 
familiar concepts in a new way, we argue that our proposal resolves many 
practical challenges with both the status quo and with previous attempts to 
develop a workable jurisprudence based on the use/regulation distinction.
Part V develops the analysis of our companion paper by considering 
additional political economy and democratic arguments for our proposal. 
The model in our companion paper was based on the assumption that all or-
gans of the host state fully and accurately internalize the welfare of all af-
fected domestic constituencies in their decision-making. This is a common 
simplifying assumption in the law and economics literature but it is not nec-
essarily empirically accurate.
18
We show that our proposal is robust to varia-
tion in this assumption. Second, we consider the risk of more serious pa-
thologies in government decision-making, such as susceptibility to lobbying 
and capture by foreign investors. We argue that our proposal is also prefera-
ble to the status quo when these risks are taken into account. Third, and per-
haps most importantly, we argue that there are strong democratic arguments 
for preferring our proposal to the status quo.
Part VI connects our proposal to the multilateral discussions about re-
form of the investor-state dispute settlement system currently underway in 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”)
Working Group III. Reform of the principles governing compensation under 
investment treaties is a key negotiating priority for developing countries. In 
October 2019, the issue of the principles governing compensation was add-
ed to the agenda of Working Group.
19
II. OUR PROPOSAL: BASIC RATIONALE AND KEY CONCEPTS
In this section we set out the basic rationale for our proposal, as devel-
oped in our companion paper. We then explain the key conceptual building 
blocks on which our proposal rests. In doing so, we clarify the series of 
questions a tribunal would need to ask, and answer, in applying our ap-
proach.
18. For example, Aisbett and Poulsen’s analysis of World Bank data survey data sug-
gests that host states treat foreign firms no worse, on average, than comparable domestic 
firms. See, e.g., Emma Aisbett & Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, Relative Treatment of Aliens: 
Firm-level Evidence from Developing Countries 1 (Glob. Econ. Governance Programme 
Working Paper No. 122, 2016).
19. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Eighth Session, ¶¶ 102–104, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9
/1004 (July 6–17, 2020).
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A.  Rationale for Our Proposal 
The argument for our proposal rests on three central claims. First, we 
argue that investment treaties should be designed to ensure that becoming 
and remaining party to a treaty benefits each state party.
20
 If investment trea-
ties did not increase welfare of all state parties to them, disadvantaged states 
would have no reason to voluntarily become or remain parties to such trea-
ties, and the regime would prove unstable in the medium to long term.
21
 In-
deed, one of the reasons for the instability we are presently seeing in the 
current regime is that many developing countries have real doubts about 
whether continuing to participate in investment treaties is in their interests.
22
 
This first claim has significant implications for our analysis. Bilateral in-
vestment treaties were historically negotiated between developed and devel-
oping countries, and many investment treaties continue to govern bilateral 




 20. Our approach is consistent with the view of some scholars. See, e.g., James R. 
Markusen, Commitment to Rules on Investment: The Developing Countries’ Stake 9 R. INT’L 
ECON. 287, 292–293, 300–01 (2001); Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Investment Treaty Law and the 
Fear for Sovereignty: Transnational Challenges and Solutions, 78 MOD. L. REV. 793, 793, 
810 (2015). It contrasts with the view of other scholars, who argue that investment treaties 
should be evaluated from an aggregate global welfare perspective, regardless of whether some 
states are left worse off. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment 
Regime, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF 
MICHAEL REISMAN 634, 635 (Mahnoush Arsanjani, Jacob Katz Cogan, Robert Sloane & 
Siegfried Wiessner eds., 2011); Roberts, supra note 5, at 378–80. 
 21. In the law and economics literature this is termed states’ “participation constraint.” 
See Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A 
Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 515 (2009). There is ample evidence that 
states are already questioning their participation in the investment treaty regime. 
 22. Poulsen and Aisbett show that the rate at which developing states enter into new 
investment treaties slows markedly following their first experience as respondent in an in-
vestment treaty arbitration. See Lauge Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits: Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning 65 WORLD POL. 273, 286 (2013). 
Some developing states, such as South Africa and India, have gone further and terminated 
existing investment treaties. See Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, An Intro-
duction, in RECONCEPTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FROM THE GLOBAL 
SOUTH 4, 19–21 (Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin eds., 2018). 
 23. The world’s largest bilateral investment relationships are between pairs of devel-
oped countries and are characterized by significant flows of investment in both directions. 
Most such investment relationships are not covered by investment treaties. For example, only 
one of Germany’s ten largest bilateral investment relationships is covered by an investment 
treaty. Following the entry into force of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, only 
one of the United States’ largest ten investment relationships is covered by an investment trea-
ty and that coverage (of the U.S.-Mexico relationship) is partial. Notwithstanding some nota-
ble exceptions, the majority of the world’s investment treaties are bilateral treaties that govern 
the relationship between a developed and a developing country. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Lauge 
Poulsen & Jason Yackee, A Future Without (Treaty-Based) ISDS: Costs and Benefits, in 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: DEMISE OR TRANSFORMATION? 
(Manfred Elsig, Rodrigo Polanco & Peter van den Bossche eds., forthcoming 2021). 
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cal terms, this means that such treaties are only justified if they benefit state 
parties that are predominantly host states.
Second, we elucidate that investment treaties, as they are currently 
drafted, address two conceptually distinct economic problems. The first is 
time inconsistency of the host state’s optimal policy toward the investment 
—a host state at least theoretically has an incentive to offer attractive condi-
tions to new foreign investment and then renege on the bargain once the in-
vestment has been made. An example is a state that grants a foreign investor 
a concession to build and operate a mine and then seizes possession of the 
mine once construction is complete. The second is a broader problem that 
the host state may undervalue foreign investors’ interests when responding 
to new information throughout the life cycle of the investment. New infor-
mation, as we understand it, encompasses a diverse range of changing cir-
cumstances, including new knowledge about an investment’s impacts, 
changes in commodity prices and underlying shifts in citizens’ political 
preferences.
24
All these events may encourage a state to change the way it 
regulates foreign investment in ways that look superficially similar to con-
duct driven by time inconsistency. Yet, such cases differ conceptually from 
situations of time inconsistency. In “pure” cases of new information, the 
host state does not benefit from inducing the investment and then changing 
the regulatory arrangements governing it. An example is a state that gives a 
foreign investor permission to commence the construction of a mine and 
then shuts the project down, citing its unacceptable environmental impacts. 
The state has gained nothing by allowing and then cancelling this invest-
ment.
Complications arise because problems of time inconsistency and new 
information are intertwined in common fact scenarios. Consider, for exam-
ple, the situation in which a host state sells a foreign investor a concession 
to build and operate a mine and, subsequently, cancels the concession, citing 
unacceptable environmental impacts arising from the mine’s operation. One 
of the major contributions of our companion paper is the development of a 
mathematical model that formalizes and clarifies the relationship between 
problems of time inconsistency and new information and shows how the 
two problems can be intertwined in a variety of complex fact scenarios.
Third, we show that solving problems of time inconsistency benefits 
both home and host states by encouraging foreign investors to proceed with 
mutually beneficial investment projects. In contrast, investment treaties that 
constrain states’ discretion to respond to new information can leave host 
states worse off, overall. While such treaties may encourage additional in-
vestment, our companion paper shows that, for several common factual sce-
narios, any benefit of such additional investment is outweighed by the risk 
24. See van Aaken, supra note 21, at 517; Henrik Horn & Thomas Tangeårs, Econom-
ics and Politics of International Investment Agreements (Rsch. Inst. for Indus. Econ., IFN 
Working Paper No. 1140, 2016).
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the host state assumes in agreeing to indemnify investors for actions taken 
in response to new information.
On this basis, we argue that investment treaties should be designed and 
interpreted to provide the minimum protection to foreign investment neces-
sary to solve time inconsistency problems for the host state. Using the tools 
of law and economics, we develop a proposal that is capable of fully solving 
problems of time inconsistency without constraining states’ ability to re-
spond to new information. We propose that a state should only have to 
compensate the investor if it breaches or modifies the domestic legal regime 
governing the investment and that compensation should be the lesser of the 
investor’s loss and the host state’s gain from the host state not having had 
the new legal regime in place when the investment was made. We show that 
our proposal increases both host and home state welfare across a diverse ar-
ray of fact scenarios compared to a counter-factual where there is no in-
vestment treaty.
B. Key Concepts: Explaining Our Proposal
To understand how our proposal would operate in practice, and how it 
compares to existing jurisprudence, it is necessary to recall the definitions of 
our conceptual building blocks, which are set out in the companion paper. 
The first of these is our concept of “the domestic legal regime.” We use this 
concept to capture the terms on which a host state allows foreign investment 
to take place in its territory. Our conception of the “domestic legal regime”
is broad; it does not depend on the designation of the instruments involved 
under the law of the host state, so long as they create binding rights and ob-
ligations. As such, the domestic legal regime is a composite concept that in-
cludes the provisions of any contract negotiated between the foreign inves-
tor and the host, as well as the powers of the host state to tax and regulate 
the investment under laws in force at the time the investment is made. The 
investment’s operating licenses—including any pre-specified taxes, charges, 
or royalty payments—also comprise part of the host state’s domestic legal 
regime. The domestic legal regime, as it relates to an investment, would or-
dinarily cover issues such as the permissible uses of land and other assets, 
mandatory regulatory requirements, and tax, royalty, and pricing arrange-
ments. Our conception of the domestic legal regime does not, however, in-
clude expectations or plans a foreign investor may have (or may claim to 
have) unless those expectations are grounded in the law of the host state. In 
Part IV we will see that this is a significant point of difference with existing 
investment treaties, which have been interpreted to protect an investor’s le-
gitimate expectations, without requiring that those expectations be grounded 
in legal entitlements.
25
25. For a typology of legitimate expectations, see Michele Potestà, Legitimate Expecta-
tions in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and Limits of a Controversial Con-
cept, 28 ICSID REV., 88, 100–19 (2013); see also JONATHAN BONNITCHA, SUBSTANTIVE 
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Because the rationale of our proposal is to solve problems of time in-
consistency for the host state, some breach or change of the domestic legal 
regime that was in place when the investment was made is a necessary con-
dition for compensation to be required. But it is not a sufficient condition. If 
this threshold condition is met, our proposal then requires a tribunal to con-
sider the situation that would have existed if the new domestic legal regime 
—or, in cases in which the host has breached rather than changed its own 
laws, a domestic legal regime that permitted such breaches—were already 
in place before the investment was originally made. This involves an exer-
cise in counter-factual reasoning. Existing principles governing compensa-
tion under investment treaties also require tribunals to engage in counter-
factual reasoning, but the relevant counter-factual under existing jurispru-
dence is different: the situation that would have existed but for the host 
state’s conduct of which the investor complains.
Compensation, under our proposal, is the lesser of the investor’s loss 
and the host state’s gain compared to the situation that would have existed if 
the new domestic legal regime was in place before the investment was orig-
inally made. In many situations, it will be uncontroversial that one or other 
of these amounts is zero, in which case no compensation is required and no 
further analysis is needed. For example, consider a host state’s unilateral re-
duction to contractually agreed tariffs paid to an investment in the utility 
sector. Such a change will inevitability reduce the investment’s profitability. 
But, if the investor would have made its investment anyway, even if the re-
duced tariff rates had been in place from the outset, it has not suffered a loss 
that is compensable under our proposal. Notwithstanding the host state’s
unilateral action, in this situation, the investor is still better off than if it had 
not invested and, therefore, has not suffered any loss as a result of its reli-
ance on the original contractually agreed tariffs.
In other scenarios the relevant gain to the host state will be zero, and no 
further inquiry is needed. The case of a state that shuts down a mine due to 
its environmental impacts is an example. Absent some additional factor, 
such as payments by the investor to the state or the construction of dual-use 
infrastructure that is subsequently repurposed by the state, a state gains 
nothing by allowing and then cancelling an investment. In this way, our 
proposal distinguishes between loss arising from regulatory change, which 
is a risk that investors should be required to bear, and the seizure of an in-
vestor’s assets by a state, which is compensable.
In situations where neither figure is zero, our proposal requires some 
compensation. A more complex valuation exercise is then needed to deter-
mine the amount of compensation. Nevertheless, calculation of compensa-
tion under our proposal is still likely to be simpler than calculation of com-
pensation under existing jurisprudence. The evidence required to determine 
PROTECTION UNDER INVESTMENT TREATIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 169 
(2014).
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compensation under our proposal will include documentation of amounts 
the investor has actually paid to the state in order to obtain permits and con-
cessions, costs actually incurred by the investor in making the investment, 
valuation of any assets or resources transferred into state ownership during 
the lifespan of the investment, and income earned by the investor up to the 
date of the dispute. Note that the evidence required to calculate compensa-
tion under our proposal relates largely to actual events in the past for which 
reliable evidence is normally available. In contrast, existing jurisprudence 
requires a tribunal to make and justify a complex set of interlocking fore-
casts about the future financial situation the investor would have been in but 
for the host state’s breach of the investment treaty. We return to these prac-
tical benefits of our proposal as compared to the status quo in Part IV.
III. THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE USE/REGULATION 
DISTINCTION
Our proposal builds on a line of a scholarship that has grappled with a 
similar intuition to that which animates our proposal—that government sei-
zure of private property differs from government regulation of private prop-
erty, and that compensation should be paid only in the case of the former. 
Foundational contributions to this literature have focused on the protection 
of private property from government “taking” under the U.S. Constitution.
26
The national constitutional context differs from an investment treaty context 
in certain respects. In particular, all costs and benefits associated with con-
stitutional protection of private property are presumptively internal to the 
state in question, which means that our application of the Pareto criterion 
would not necessarily play out in the same way in a constitutional context.
27
Nevertheless, debates about the protection of private property under the 
U.S. Constitution remain an important point of reference, both because key 
provisions of investment treaties are a codification of U.S. constitutional 
doctrine,
28
and because other influential scholars in the field take these de-
bates as their starting point for an analysis of investment treaties.
29
In this 
section we trace the development of the use/regulation distinction as an al-
26. The fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides “nor shall private property 
be taken for public use without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. Institutional considerations in the United States also differ somewhat from interna-
tional investment law. See, e.g., WILLIAM A FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995). Fischel’s account of takings jurisprudence turns largely 
on differences in the decision-making between local government and national government. 
The relationship between our proposal and institutional considerations that are specific to the 
investment treaty regime is considered infra Part V.
28. See infra Section IV.A.
29. Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1435, 1469 (2000); Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? 
NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory 
Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 78 (2003).
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ternative to balancing techniques. We also draw attention to some signifi-
cant challenges that have complicated attempts to build a coherent jurispru-
dence on the use/regulation distinction.
In the mid-twentieth century, U.S. constitutional jurisprudence on the 
protection of private property was widely regarded as inconsistent and lack-
ing any underlying theoretical justification. At the time, there were three 
mutually inconsistent threads in jurisprudence, each with its own prob-
lems.
30
The first approach required compensation whenever government ac-
tion entailed physical possession or occupation of private property.
31
But the 
application of this principle led to bizarre results—notably that trivial incur-
sions into physical property would require compensation, while severe inter-
ference with intangible property rights would be non-compensable.
32
The 
second approach required compensation when government action sought to 
secure some public benefit but not when it aimed to prevent a harm.
33
But 
this test suffered from indeterminacy. Prevention of almost any harm can be 
reframed as creation of a public benefit—for example, prevention of pollu-
tion could be understood as promoting a clean environment.
34
The third ap-
proach required compensation whenever government action led to a signifi-
cant diminution of the value of private property.
35
But this test suffered from 
indeterminacy of a different sort. If a government expropriated ten acres of 
land from a 100 acre bloc, should this be understood as a minor diminution 
in the value of the 100 acre bloc, or a complete destruction of the value of 
the expropriated portion?
36
The third test also cut against lawyers and poli-
cy-makers’ intuitions about the contours of a fair takings jurisprudence, in
30. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964); Jed 
Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1088 (1993); Been & Beauvais, supra note 29, at 
59–61.
31. Sax, supra note 30, at 46; Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at 1083 (citing Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982) as examples).
32. Sax, supra note 30, at 46–47.
33. Sax, supra note 30, at 48; Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at 1085 (citing Mugler v. Kan-
sas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
34. Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit Line in Tak-
ings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENV’T L.J. 433, 435 (1995); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
35. Sax, supra note 30, at 50; Rubenfeld supra note 30, at 1086–87 (citing Pa. Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1992)).
36. “The underlying conceptual problem is that, ‘to the extent that any portion of prop-
erty is taken, that portion is always taken in its entirety.’ ” Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002) (citing Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., 
Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993)). For discussion of 
this problem in an investment treaty context, see Vaughan Lowe, Changing Dimensions of 
International Investment Law 62–64 (Oxford Legal Studs. Rsch. Paper No. 4, 2007); 
SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION 268 (2009); 
BONNITCHA, supra note 25, at 236–37.
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that it would require compensation in situations where a property owner 
complains of otherwise-lawful government action that the owner knew was 
likely to occur when it acquired the property in question.
Modern legal scholarship takes these problems with mid-twentieth cen-
tury jurisprudence as its starting point. In response, two general approaches 
to reformulation were proposed in the academic literature. The first argued 
that determining whether government interference with private property re-
quires compensation inevitably involves weighing and balancing of a range 
of competing factors and sought to provide a framework to guide such exer-
cises in balancing. In an influential 1967 article, Frank Michelman argued 
that determining the appropriate level of protection of private property re-
quired the weighing of all the private and social costs involved.
37
In the 
Penn Central decision, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a version of 
Michelman’s proposal, noting that the following factors would need to be 
balanced: “The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, par-
ticularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct in-
vestment backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, 
too, is the character of the governmental action.”
38
Other frameworks for organizing balancing inquiries were influential 
elsewhere. For example, in resolving claims of the violation of the right to 
property, the European Court of Human Rights mandates a balancing in-
quiry organized around the concept of proportionality.
39
Scholars such as 
Robert Alexy have subsequently explored and clarified the conceptual 
foundations of proportionality as an organizing principle for a structured 
balancing inquiry.
40
A second response to the problems with takings jurisprudence was to 
suggest that a distinction could be drawn between different types of gov-
ernment conduct. In a seminal article in the Yale Law Journal, Joseph Sax 
proposed a “distinction between the role of government as participant and 
the government as mediator in the process of competition among competing 
37. Michelman argued that a full accounting of costs and benefits could be organized 
under the headings of “efficiency gains,” “demoralization costs,” and “settlement costs.”
Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
“Just Compensation” Law, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967). Michelman’s framework 
has been heavily criticized, including by other proponents of balancing. See, e.g., Robert 
Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 
21–22 (1985).
38. Penn Central Transp. Co v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
39. Tom Allen, Compensation for Property Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 287, 294 (2007); see also Yves Winisdoerffer, Margin of Appre-
ciation and Article 1 of Protocol No 1, 19 HUM. RTS. L.J. 18, 19 (1998). For an example of 
the methodology see Sporrong v. Sweden, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 21, ¶ 73 (1982).
40. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 66–67 (Julian Rivers 
trans., 2002); see also, KAI MÖLLER, THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 13–
15 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012); AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 3–4 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
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economics [interests].”
41
He argued that compensation should be required 
whenever government acts in the former enterprise capacity, but not when it 
acts in the latter capacity as a mediator between competing private interests. 
The application of this distinction leads to different results than balancing 
tests. Under Sax’s approach, compensation will always be required when 
the government acquires resources from a private actor—for example, pen-
cils for use in government agencies—even when the value of the resources 
acquired is low and there is clear public interest justification for their acqui-
sition. In contrast, it suggests that regulatory action—for example, pollution 
control legislation—should not be compensable, even when that action is 
unexpected and leads to severe economic loss for specific private actors.
Sax’s argument was based on a theory that government acting in its en-
terprise capacity has incentives to interfere with private property for the 
benefit of the state itself, which are absent when government acts as a medi-
ator.
42
Subsequent scholars further developed Sax’s argument, arguing that 
protecting private property from government acting in its capacity as a me-
diator is unlikely to improve government conduct, even if one assumes that 
governments are prone to mediate between interests in ways that are unfair 
and arbitrary. For example, Susan Rose-Ackerman and Jim Rossi argue that 
imposing legal obligations on government to pay compensation for interfer-
ence with private property is unlikely to redress government dysfunction in 
mediating between private interests because the burden of compensation ul-
timately falls on taxpayers, rather than government decision-makers them-
selves.
43
Vicki Been and Joel C. Beauvais put forward that extending legal 
protection to private property from action taken by the government in its ca-
pacity as mediator fails to redress a dysfunctional government’s hypothe-
sized indifference to the benefits that regulatory actions create for various 
constituencies, leading to excessive caution on the part of government.
44
These arguments strengthen the case for focusing constitutional protection 
of private property exclusively on disciplining government action in its en-
terprise capacity. We return to their relevance for the drafting of investment 
treaties in Part V.
Although Sax’s proposal was not adopted in U.S. law, his ideas are re-
flected in jurisprudence elsewhere. Under Australian constitutional jurispru-
dence, for example, government interference with private property is only 
compensable if it constitutes an acquisition of that property.45 Under Cana-
dian statutory protections of private property, compensation is only required 
for regulatory action if there has been an appropriation of a property interest 
41. Sax, supra note 30, at 62.
42. Sax, supra note 30, at 61–64.
43. Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 29, at 1482.
44. Been & Beauvais, supra note 29, at 96–100.
45. Georgiadis v Australian & Overseas Telecomms Corp (1994) 179 CLR 297 
(Austl.).
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by the state itself.
46
These examples are important, in that they show that a 
jurisprudence organized around the distinction between government action 
in its enterprise and in its mediator capacity represents a genuine, practical 
alternative approach to a jurisprudence organized around the balancing of 
competing interests.
We share the intuition that animates Sax’s account. However, his argu-
ment was not based on any underlying economic analysis of the problem of 
time inconsistency, which led to several difficulties. First, it assumed that 
the distinction between government acting in an enterprise capacity and in a 
mediator capacity was self-evident, without proposing a means for drawing 
the line between the two categories.
47
Subsequent scholars recognized this 
challenge, but still continued to assume that cases could be classified as in-
volving government acting in either one or other capacity.
48
Second, Sax’s
approach seemed to suggest that any increase in tax rates should be fully 
compensable, a conclusion which he rightly regarded as untenable.
49
In a 1993 article, Jed Rubenfeld sought to address the former problem 
by recasting the distinction as one between government “use” and “regula-
tion” of private property, with only the former requiring compensation.
50
To 
distinguish between government use and government regulation of property, 
he proposed that interference with private property would not amount to a 
compensable use if the state’s interest would be “equally well served by de-
stroying that thing altogether.” But Rubenfeld’s approach creates anomalies, 
particularly when applied to intangible property.
51
His approach would re-
46. Bryan P Schwartz & Melanie R Bueckert, Regulatory Takings in Canada, 5 WASH.
UNIV. GLOB. STUDS. L. REV. 477, 488 (2006); Matthew C. Porterfield, State Practice and the 
(Purported) Obligation Under Customary International Law to Provide Compensation for 
Regulatory Expropriations, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 159, 179 (2011); Andrew New-
combe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law, 20 ICSID REV. 1, 
8–9 (2005).
47. Sax’s most precise statement of his rule is as follows:
When an individual or limited group in society sustains a detriment to legally ac-
quired existing economic values as a consequence of government activity which 
enhances the economic value of some government enterprise, then the act is a tak-
ing, and compensation is constitutionally required; but when the challenged act is 
an improvement of the public condition through resolution of conflict within the 
private sector of the society, compensation is not constitutionally required.
Sax, supra note 30, at 67. This rule turns on the concept of “government enterprise,” which is 
illustrated with examples but never defined.
48. Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 29, at 1478. Other scholars have argued that 
this challenge proves that recourse to balancing techniques is inevitable. See MONTT, supra 
note 36, at 191–98, 237–42.
49. Sax, supra note 30, at 75–76.
50. Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at 1116.
51. Rubenfeld rejected the consequentialist approach of law and economics. Rubenfeld, 
supra note 30, at 1131–34. Yet, engaging more deeply with the insights of law and economics 
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quire compensation if the government sells public land to an investor and 
then renationalizes the land the following day, but not if the government 
sells an investor a concession to operate a mobile phone network on a des-
ignated spectrum and then cancels the concession the following day, having 
pocketed the sale price.
52
 Been and Beauvais’s argument that investment 
treaties should constrain only physical seizure or assumption of control of 
foreign investment suffers from the same problem.
53
 
In an important 2009 article on the drafting and interpretation of in-
vestment treaties, Anne van Aaken puts the use/regulation distinction on a 
firmer conceptual footing by drawing attention to the underlying distinction 
between government conduct that is opportunistic and government conduct 
that responds to new information.
54
 She argues that government conduct 
should only be compensable if it is opportunistic. We agree. But van Aaken 
left three significant challenges posed by the insight unaddressed. First, she 
assumes that state conduct can be classified as either opportunistic or as re-
sponding to new information. Second, discussion of the principles govern-
ing compensation under investment treaties is not integrated into her analy-
sis, notwithstanding that the consequences of breach are essential to 
economic analysis of the ex ante effects of legal rules. Third, her approach 
requires tribunals to determine, after the fact, whether impugned conduct 
was a response to information that was genuinely “new.”
55
 She rightly rec-
ognized that this task poses immense practical difficulties.
56
 In the following 
section, we show how our proposal addresses and resolves all three chal-
lenges. 
 
might have encouraged him to develop an approach that treated functionally similar cases 
similarly, regardless of their formal designation. 
 52. Such cases have proved consistently difficult for courts in countries, such as Aus-
tralia and Canada, where constitutional protection of private property turns on whether there 
has been an acquisition or appropriation of private property. See, e.g., Newcrest Mining (WA) 
Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 514 (Austl.); Newcombe, supra note 46, at 46. New-
combe’s proposed solution is that compensation should be required when state conduct annuls 
or otherwise destroys “contractual commitment or authorization upon which an investor re-
lied.” However, this solution would require compensation in cases where state conduct that 
would otherwise be classified as “regulatory” interferes with contractual rights. It would also 
lead to an anomaly in that contractual rights would benefit from greater legal protection than 
rights of ownership in relation to physical property. To date, doctrines developed by such 
courts to address the issue have been ad hoc and unconvincing. See, e.g., ICM Agric Pty v 
Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, ¶ 149 (Austl.). 
 53. Been & Beauvais, supra note 29, at 142. 
 54. van Aaken, supra note 21, at 517–19. 
 55. Id. at 526. 
 56. Id. at 526. 
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IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION AND PRINCIPLES 
GOVERNING COMPENSATION
In this section we examine how our proposal compares to existing ju-
risprudence under investment treaties. We begin with a brief review of in-
vestment treaties as they are currently drafted and interpreted. We show that 
the application of core investment treaty protections requires tribunals to 
engage in the balancing of competing interests. If the host state is found to 
have breached one of these protections, compensation equals the loss the 
investor has suffered compared to a future counter-factual in which the host 
state has not breached the treaty. Having clarified the status quo, we exam-
ine how our proposal differs, using case examples to illustrate. This exercise 
also demonstrates that our proposal is feasible, in that it relies on infor-
mation and legal techniques that are available and familiar to arbitral tribu-
nals. Finally, we show how our proposal resolves many of the practical 
challenges associated with both the status quo and with plausible alterna-
tives, including the three challenges associated with previous attempts to 
operationalize the use/regulation distinction that we identified in Part III.
A.  The Status Quo: Investment Treaties as Currently Drafted and 
Interpreted
1. Substantive Protection: “Balancing” as a Mode of Reasoning
As currently drafted, investment treaties grant a common suite of legal 
protections to foreign investment. These include guarantees of compensa-
tion for expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, and compliance with 
contractual obligations that the host state has incurred in relation to the in-
vestment. These core standards are sometimes described as “absolute” pro-
tections, in the sense that the extent of the host state’s obligations does not 
depend on how domestic investment is treated.
57
Investment treaties also contain “relative” provisions guaranteeing non-
discriminatory treatment to foreign investment, as well as provisions that 
guarantee minimum standards of due process in adjudicative proceedings 
within the host state’s legal system.
58
Such provisions are much less likely 
57. Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International 
Investment Law 2 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv. No. 3, 2004).
58. One complication is that the general obligation to provide fair and equitable treat-
ment (“FET”) to foreign investment is normally understood to incorporate a minimum guaran-
tee of due process in adjudicative proceedings as one of the constituent “elements” of the gen-
eral obligation. For example, USMCA, supra note 4, art. 14.6(2)(a) reads “fair and equitable 
treatment includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adju-
dicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the princi-
pal legal systems of the world.” This treaty language is widely understood to incorporate the 
customary international law doctrine of denial of justice into the FET standard. However, in 
practice, few claims that a state has breached the FET standard turn on an allegation of denial 
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to constitute the basis for ISDS claims against host states.
59
While our pro-
posal may also have implications for the reform of treaty provisions dealing 
with discrimination and due process,
60
in this section we focus on its impli-
cations for reform of investment treaties’ core absolute standards, which 
give rise to the majority of investment treaty disputes. These guarantees are 
normally drafted in vague language, the meaning and implications of which 
has been established through interpretation and application by arbitral tribu-
nals.
The most important substantive protection contained in investment trea-
ties is the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment (“FET”). This provision 
is both the clause that foreign investors invoke most frequently in arbitration 
and the one with which they have the highest rate of success.
61
Tribunals’
interpretations of FET provisions are not entirely consistent. Tribunals have 
held, variously, that FET provisions protect investors from conduct that is 
unreasonable, disproportionate, or inconsistent with investors’ legitimate 
of justice. For detailed discussion of the doctrine of denial of justice, see JAN PAULSSON, 
DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
59. For example, UNCTAD statistics show that breach of an investment treaty’s FET 
provision has been alleged in 449 cases; breach of an investment treaty’s indirect expropria-
tion provision has been alleged in 412 cases; and breach of an umbrella clause has been al-
leged in 143 cases. In contrast, breach of national treatment provisions has been alleged in 
only 134 cases, and only nine such claims have been successful. See Investment Dispute Set-
tlement Navigator, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org
/investment-dispute-settlement (last visited May 27, 2020).
60. In principle, our proposal is capable of subsuming investment treaties’ guarantees 
of due process and non-discriminatory treatment. With respect to due process, the logic of our 
proposal is that investment treaties should function as devices that allow states to credibly 
commit to observing whatever level of procedural fairness that state has chosen to offer to 
foreign investment as a matter of law. With respect to non-discriminatory treatment, the logic 
of our proposal is that there should not be any freestanding prohibition on discriminatory 
treatment. Discriminatory treatment would sometimes require compensation under our rule, 
but only to the extent the host state’s conduct was opportunistic and therefore captured by the 
normal operation of our rule. In this way, our proposal would avoid many of the conceptual 
challenges facing existing jurisprudence on de facto discrimination - notably, the challenge in 
determining whether any difference in the burden of complying with a government measure 
between investors is justified by the host state’s policy objective. For discussion of these con-
ceptual challenges, see ANDREW D. MITCHELL, DAVID HEATON & CAROLINE HENCKELS, 
NON-DISCRIMINATION AND THE ROLE OF REGULATORY PURPOSE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND INVESTMENT LAW 141 (2016) (citing AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of 
Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 10.3.9 (Sept. 23, 2010), http:
//icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C114/DC1730_En.pdf). While 
noting these implications of our proposal, we also note that there are arguments in support of 
existing guarantees of due process and non-discriminatory treatment beyond those that we 
consider in this paper. For this reason, we do not take a position on whether these more radical 
reforms of investment treaties would be desirable.
61. Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, supra note 59; BONNITCHA ET AL., supra 
note 1.
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expectations.
62
Notwithstanding differences between the various “elements”
of the FET standard, these doctrines all require tribunals to balance the harm 
state conduct causes to the foreign investor against other policy justifica-
tions for the state’s action.
63
In this sense, they all require tribunals to adopt 
the same mode of reasoning.
Balancing as a mode of reasoning is most explicit in decisions evaluat-
ing the proportionality of state conduct under FET provisions. For example, 
in emphasizing that host states retain relatively broad discretion to regulate 
foreign investment, the tribunal in Electrabel v. Hungary explained that the 
boundaries of that discretion were to be charted through the balancing of 
competing interests:
[T]he Tribunal considers that the application of the [Energy Charter 
Treaty’s] FET standard allows for a balancing exercise by the host 
State in appropriate circumstances. The host State is not required to 
elevate unconditionally the interests of the foreign investor above 
all other considerations in every circumstance. As was decided by 
the tribunals in Saluka v Czech Republic and Arif v Moldova, an 
FET standard may legitimately involve a balancing or weighing ex-
ercise by the host State. . . .
. . . [“T]here needs to be an appropriate correlation between the 
state’s public policy objective and the measure adopted to achieve 
it. This has to do with the nature of the measure and the way it is 
implemented.” In the Tribunal’s view, this includes the requirement 
that the impact of the measure on the investor be proportional to the 
62. The challenges of providing an internally consistent account of existing FET juris-
prudence have been explored in detail in the academic literature. These challenges are reflect-
ed by the fact that, while almost all commentators agree that it is useful to divide FET juris-
prudence into decisions dealing with different “elements” of the standard, no two text writers 
propose an identical system of classification. See ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE & LLUIS 
PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 275 (2009); DOLZER &
SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 145; IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 
STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 154 (2008); JESWALD 
SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 218 (2010); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 190, 234 (2010); CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE 
SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE 
PRINCIPLES 226 (2007); RONALD KLÄGER, ‘FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT’ IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 117–18 (2011); BONNITCHA, supra note 25, at 163.
63. Academic scholarship recognizes that arbitral decisions applying the FET standard 
engage in balancing. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Public Law Con-
cepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest—the 
Concept of Proportionality, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE 
PUBLIC LAW 75 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010); CAROLINE HENCKELS, PROPORTIONALITY 
AND DEFENCE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 
2015); David Gaukrodger, Addressing the Balance of Interests in Investment Treaties: The 
Limitation of Fair and Equitable Treatment Provisions to the Minimum Standard of Treat-
ment Under Customary International Law (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv. No. 3, 2017).
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policy objective sought. The relevance of the proportionality of the 
measure has been increasingly addressed by investment tribunals 
and other international tribunals, including the ECtHR. The test for 
proportionality has been developed from certain municipal admin-
istrative laws, and requires the measure to be suitable to achieve a 
legitimate policy objective, necessary for that objective, and not 
excessive considering the relative weight of each interest in-
volved.
64
Subsequent decisions have endorsed these statements in principle, while ap-
plying such balancing tests in a way that is arguably more favorable to the 
investor. For example, in Novenergia v. Spain, the tribunal held that “the 
assessment of whether the FET standard has been breached is a balancing 
exercise, where the state’s regulatory interests are weighed against the in-
vestors’ legitimate expectations and reliance.”
65
Balancing also underpins the influential doctrine of legitimate expecta-
tions. For example, in Duke Energy v. Ecuador, the tribunal explained that 
FET standard protects expectations derived from “conditions that the State 
offered the investor” at the time an investment was made. To determine 
whether an expectation is legitimate—i.e. whether its violation triggers the 
liability of the host state—a tribunal “must take into account all circum-
stances, including not only the facts surrounding the investment, but also the 
political, socioeconomic, cultural, and historical conditions prevailing in the 
host State.”
66
To assess whether the host state breached the investor’s legit-
imate expectations, tribunals routinely weigh the investor’s interest in the 
stability of government policy against the state’s regulatory objectives.
67
The tribunal in Oostergetel v. Slovakia summarized the doctrine simply, in 
the following terms: “legitimate expectations must be measured through a 
balancing test taking account of specific circumstances.”
68
Other common substantive protections found in investment treaties re-
quire tribunals to engage in balancing as a mode of reasoning. Many recent 
investment treaties explicitly instruct tribunals to engage in a balancing ex-
64. Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Award, ¶¶ 165, 
179 (Nov. 25, 2015), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C111
/DC7353_En.pdf.
65. Novenergia II—Energy and Env’t (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Lux.), SICAR v. King-
dom of Spain, Arb. Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Com. [SCC] Case No. 2015/063, Final 
Arbitral Award, 30 World Trade & Arb. Materials 947, ¶ 694 (2018).
66. Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB
/04/19, Award, ¶ 340 (Aug. 18, 2008), 20 World Trade & Arb. Materials 189 (Dec. 2008).
67. See, e.g., Saluka Invs. BV (The Neth.) v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 18 
World Trade & Arb. Materials 169, ¶ 306 (UNCITRAL, June 2006); Total S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, ¶ 309 (Dec. 27, 2010), http:
//icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C30/DC7833_En.pdf.
68. Oostergetel v. The Slovak Republic, Final Award, ¶ 224 (UNCITRAL, 2012), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0933.pdf.
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ercise to determine whether a compensable indirect expropriation has oc-
curred. For example, treaties based on the 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty (“BIT”) contains the following clarification of the concept 
of indirect expropriation, which is based on U.S. Supreme Court’s Penn 
Central decision:
The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a 
Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropria-
tion, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, 
among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the 
fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse 
effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, 
does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with 
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.
69
Tribunals and commentators have understood this clarification as requiring 
a particular form of structured balancing inquiry: one that weighs the meas-
ure’s adverse impact on the investment and the extent to which the investor 
had relied on the legal regime that existed prior to the measure against po-
tential justifications for the measure.
70
Similar clarifications have dissemi-
nated widely beyond U.S. treaty practice, and are now found in the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations Comprehensive Investment Agreement, the 
Canada-European Union Trade Agreement, and the China-Japan-Korea In-
vestment Treaty, among others.
71
Even in cases where the relevant invest-
ment treaty does not explicitly clarify the meaning of indirect expropriation, 
69. Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative [USTR], U.S. Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty, Annex B (2004).
70. See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Final Award, 48 I.L.M. 1038, ¶ 356 
(UNCITRAL, 2009); Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14
/21, Award, ¶ 377 (Nov. 30, 2017), 30 World Trade & Arb. Materials 5 (2018); L. Yves Forti-
er (CC, QC) & Stephen L. Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Invest-
ment: I Know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 13 ASIA PAC. L. REV., 79, 100 (2005); Ra-
chel Esdall, Indirect Expropriation Under NAFTA and DR-CAFTA: Potential Inconsistencies 
in the Treatment of State Public Welfare Regulations, 86 B.U. L. REV. 931, 957 (2006); 
BONNITCHA, supra note 25, at 263–70.
71. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations Comprehensive Investment Agree-
ment, annex II, Feb. 26, 2008, https://asean.org/asean-economic-community/asean-
investment-area-aia-council; CETA, supra note 10, annex VIII; Protocol to the Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement between Japan, Republic of Korea, and China art. 2, 
May 13, 2012, https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/pdfs/0513_01_01.pdf.
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tribunals have used balancing techniques to determine whether a compensa-
ble indirect expropriation has occurred.
72
The key conclusion that emerges from the foregoing review of existing 
jurisprudence is that, to determine whether the host state has breached 
common substantive protections in investment treaties, arbitral tribunals 
frequently balance the interests of the investor against those of the host 
state. It is important to attach some caveats to this conclusion. First, we rec-
ognize that there are diverse legal techniques to balance competing interests. 
Often the choice of one technique over another will be decisive in a particu-
lar case.
73
For example, in Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the dissenting arbitra-
tor argued that the FET provision placed a more demanding burden of justi-
fication on the host state than that accepted by the majority.
74
On this basis, 
the dissenting arbitrator would have found that Uruguay had breached the 
investment treaty. Second, we recognize that not all disputes under invest-
ment treaties require a tribunal to engage in balancing. For example, tribu-
nals have resolved claims under umbrella clauses by determining the host 
state had breached an underlying investment contract. This requires the tri-
bunal to apply the law governing the underlying contract, normally the law 
of the host state itself.
75
Our claim is not that tribunals engage in balancing 
in every investment treaty dispute, but rather that the majority of investment 
treaty disputes across a range of common treaty provisions require tribunals 
to engage in some form of balancing of competing interests.
76
This conclu-
sion is important, as one of the key features of our proposal is that it does 
not require tribunals to engage in balancing.
2. Prospective, Loss-Based Compensation
Investment treaties, as they are currently drafted, only explicitly address 
the amount of compensation due in the event of an expropriation. The basic 
principle, contained in almost every investment treaty, is that compensation 
72. See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004); LG&E Ener-
gy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 189 
(Oct. 3, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 36 (2006); PL Holdings S.à.r.l. v. Republic of Poland, SCC Case No. 
V2014/163, Partial Award, ¶ 355 (2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw9378.pdf.
73. Indeed, much of the debate among legal scholars can be understood as a debate 
about which forms/techniques of balancing are appropriate in different circumstances.
74. Compare Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switz.) v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 305 (Jul. 8, 2016), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid
/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1000/DC9012_En.pdf, with id. ¶ 150 (Arb. Born, dissenting).
75. See, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, Art. X(2) (Jan. 29, 2004), 
8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005).
76. Moreover, we show that some of most controversial and problematic cases are 
those in which tribunals have been engaged in balancing. See infra Section IV.C.2.ii.
Winter 2021] Against Balancing 253
should equal the fair market value of the expropriated investment. The fair 
market value of an investment is the amount that a willing buyer would pay 
a willing seller for the investment in an arm’s length transaction immediate-
ly before the expropriation took place.
77
Conceptually, the fair market value 
of an investment, as a revenue-generating asset, reflects the risk-adjusted 
present value of the future net revenue stream of that investment.
78
Fair 
market value differs conceptually from other measures of compensation, 
such as the costs the investor has incurred in making or acquiring the in-
vestment, although tribunals have occasionally calculated compensation on 
this basis when there is insufficient evidence to estimate its future revenue.
79
Investment treaties do not clarify the amount of compensation due for 
breaches of the treaties’ other substantive provisions. (And, technically, the 
fair market-value standard only applies insofar as compensation is paid 
promptly at the time of expropriation, which is invariably not the case in 
claims that are litigated in investment treaty arbitration.)
80
In the absence of 
textual guidance, tribunals have looked to the wider principles of customary 
international law.
81
On this basis, tribunals have consistently applied the 
principle that compensation should provide “full reparation” by restoring 
the investor to the position it would have been in “but for” the breach of the 
treaty.
82
There are differences between the “full reparation” and “fair market 
value” principles that, in certain fact scenarios, could be significant.
83
How-
ever, in most fact scenarios, the application of the two sets of principles 
leads to similar, or even identical, results.
84
For present purpose, the basic 
77. See, e.g., Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative [USTR], U.S. Model Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty, art. 6(2), (2012); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/8, Final Award, ¶ 402 (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005).
78. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 297.
79. See, e.g., Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶¶ 123–
125 (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 933 (2002).
80. Expropriations that are not carried out consistently with investment treaties’ re-
quirements, including the requirement of prompt payment of compensation, are sometimes 
termed “unlawful” expropriations. See, e.g., ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID 
Case No ARB/03/16, Award (Oct. 2, 2006), 18 World Trade & Arb. Materials 285 (Dec. 
2006). For discussion and criticism of the lawful/unlawful expropriation distinction, see Rat-
ner, supra note 11.
81. In the legal literature, the term “damages” is often used to distinguish the principles 
governing compensation owed for breach of an investment treaty from those governing com-
pensation for an expropriation carried out in accordance with the treaty’s provisions.
82. IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 72–85 (2d ed. 2017).
83. The main differences between the two principles concern the date of valuation and 
the range of consequential losses that the investor is entitled to recover. For detailed discus-
sion of the application of these principles in the context of expropriation disputes, see Ratner, 
supra note 11. For a more comprehensive examination of the application of these principles in 
relation to expropriation disputes and other treaty breaches, see MARBOE, supra note 82.
84. See, e.g., Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶ 843 (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
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equivalence of the two sets of principles is more important than the nuances. 
Regardless of which set of principles is applied, compensation for breach of 
an investment treaty is effectively equivalent to the investor’s loss relative 
to a counter-factual future scenario in which the host state does not breach 
the treaty. This standard is analogous to “expectation damages” in contract 
law.
85
B. How Our Proposal Differs from the Status Quo
1. Our Proposal
Our proposal calls for a conceptual reorientation of the principles gov-
erning liability and compensation under investment treaties. In contrast to 
the set of absolute protections commonly found in investment treaties, our 
approach is deliberately parsimonious. We propose and justify the simplest 
possible combination of liability rules and compensation standards that can 
achieve what we take to be the treaties’ objective: ensuring both state parties 
are better off from becoming and remaining party to an investment treaty. 
Our proposal is that:
i. A state should only face the possibility of having to com-
pensate a foreign investor if the host state breaches or 
modifies the domestic legal regime governing the invest-
ment, and
ii. Compensation should be the lesser of the investor’s loss 
and the host state’s gain from the host state not having had 
the new domestic legal regime in place when the invest-
ment was made. (If one of these values is zero, no compen-
sation is required.)
As such, our proposal requires a tribunal to answer three successive ques-
tions. This section explores each of these questions in more detail. In doing 
so, we clarify how our proposal differs from the status quo. We also show 
that our proposal is practically feasible, in that it relies on sources of evi-
dence and types of expertise that tribunals either possess themselves or are 
likely to have access to.
The first question is whether the host state has breached or modified the 
domestic legal regime that governed the investment at the time the invest-
ment was made. Such a breach or modification is a necessary, but not suffi-
documents/italaw7194.pdf (“the Tribunal considers that in this particular case this discussion 
is rather theoretical and devoid of significant practical effects”); Siag v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶ 542 (June 1, 2009), 21 World Trade & Arb. 
Materials 1171 (2009).
85. See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON.
466 (1980).
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cient, condition for the state’s liability. The focus on the domestic legal re-
gime reflects the fact that our proposal is designed to provide states with a 
way to make domestic legal commitments credible, thereby solving the 
problem of time inconsistency of state conduct.
86
Although existing juris-
prudence is not entirely consistent, this focus on stabilizing the domestic le-
gal regime is consistent with well-established threads of jurisprudence. For 
example, the tribunal in GAMI v. Mexico explained that:
International law does not appraise the content of a regulatory pro-
gramme extant before an investor decides to commit. The inquiry is 
whether the state abided by or implemented that programme. It is in 
this sense that a government’s failure to implement or abide by its 
own law in a manner adversely affecting a foreign investor may but 
will not necessarily lead to a violation of [the investment treaty].
87
Our conception of the “domestic legal regime” includes the combination of 
rights and obligations created by any contract negotiated between the inves-
tor and the host state, as well as the powers of the host state to regulate the 
investment under laws in force at the time the investment is made. The do-
mestic legal regime governing the investment defines questions such as 
permissible uses of land and other assets, mandatory regulatory require-
ments, and tax, royalty, and pricing arrangements. The domestic legal re-
gime also defines the state’s power to take action related to the investment 
in specified circumstances—for example, environmental laws in force when 
the investment is made might give the state’s environmental agency the 
power to shut the investment down for serious and persistent non-
compliance with limits on pollution. This understanding of the domestic le-
gal regime is consistent with the position of the U.S. government, which, in 
submissions to investor-state arbitral tribunals, has consistently argued that 
“in an instance where property rights are subject to legal limitations existing 
at the time the property rights are acquired, any subsequent burdening of 
property rights by such limitations does not constitute an impairment of the 
original property interest.”
88
Our conception of the domestic legal regime does not, however, include 
expectations that foreign investors have, or may claim to have, that are not 
grounded in law. In this respect our proposal is narrower than existing juris-
86. See, e.g., Markusen, supra note 20; Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties 
That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 639, 659 (1998).
87. Gami Invs. Inc. v. United Mexican States, Award, 44 I.L.M. 545, ¶ 91 
(UNCITRAL, 2005).
88. Lone Pine Res. Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2, Submission of 
the United States of America, 5 n.15 (Aug. 16, 2017), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid
/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C4406/DC10978_En.pdf.
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prudence as it relates to the protection of investors’ “legitimate expecta-
tions.”
89
The question of whether a state has changed or breached the domestic 
legal regime is a question of law, and therefore the type of question that ar-
bitrators should be capable of answering.
90
Under existing jurisprudence, 
tribunals routinely decide whether a host state has changed or breached its 
domestic legal regime as one step in the more complex application of exist-
ing investment treaty provisions. For example, in the Argentinian gas cases, 
several tribunals observed that Argentina’s unilateral modification of tariff 
rates changed the legal regime governing those investments;
91
in Bilcon v. 
Canada, the tribunal determined that the way the environmental assessment 
of the investor’s proposal was conducted breached Canadian law.
92
Tribu-
nals also apply domestic law in a range of other contexts under existing in-
vestment treaty jurisprudence.
93
Under our proposal, if the answer to this 
question is “yes,” then the host state may be liable for a breach of the in-
vestment treaty, subject to the answers to the second and third question. If 
the answer to this question is “no,” no further questions arise.
If the first question is answered affirmatively, the inquiry then moves to 
the second—and, potentially, the third—question. Both the second and third 
questions relate to the quantum of relevant loses and gains incurred by the 
disputing parties. This reveals a significant difference between the structure 
of our proposal and existing jurisprudence. Under existing jurisprudence, 
89. In the past, tribunals have found that investors had legitimate expectations that were 
derived from the generally supportive attitude of the authorities of the host state toward the 
investment, or from the investor’s own business plans. See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. 
Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 163 (May 25, 2004), 44 I.L.M 91 (2005); Walter 
Bau Ag. v. Thailand, Award, 22 World Trade & Arb. Materials 681, ¶¶ 12.2–12.3 
(UNCITRAL, 2010). Under our proposal, such claims would inevitably fail.
90. Under normal principles of private international law, courts and tribunals are often 
called on to apply the law of a jurisdiction with which they may not be familiar. This is a 
normal and entirely unremarkable aspect of adjudication of disputes with international dimen-
sions. Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that the quality of investment tribunals’
engagement with domestic law under existing jurisprudence is patchy. See, e.g., JARROD 
HEPBURN, DOMESTIC LAW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 192 (2017). That 
said, there are also many examples of good practice, and commentators have also provided 
constructive advice on how questions of domestic law might be resolved as a practical mat-
ter—for example, through reliance on appropriate domestic materials and expert witnesses. Id.
at 182–92.
91. See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 130–134 (Oct. 3, 2006), 46 I.L.M 36 (2006).
92. Bilcon of Del., Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Permanent Ct. of Arb. [PCA] Case No. 2009-
04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 600–602 (2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw4212.pdf.
93. For example, tribunals inevitably apply domestic law in determining the existence 
and extent of the investor’s property rights that constitute the investment, as international law 
contains no rules on property rights. See HEPBURN, supra note 90, at 106; Zachary Douglas, 
The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 204 
(2003).
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the practical outcome of a dispute normally turns on whether the substantive 
protections of the investment treaty have been breached. In contrast, most of 
the analytical work in our proposal is done by the principles governing the 
quantum. The possibility of an investor obtaining compensation for minor 
breaches or changes to the domestic legal regime will ordinarily be exclud-
ed at this stage.
The second question is the extent of loss suffered by the foreign inves-
tor as a result of the state not having had the new domestic legal regime in 
place at the time that the investment was made.
94
This question involves 
valuation on a counter-factual basis, but the counter-factual is different from 
that currently used to calculate compensation for breach of investment trea-
ties. For example, if a state imposes new restrictions on a coal-fired power 
station’s water usage, our proposal requires the tribunal to determine what 
would have occurred if the restrictions were already in place prior to the in-
vestment being made. The evidence required to construct this past counter-
factual can be found in the historical record, particularly as it relates to the 
investor’s investment decision and actually incurred expenses. In contrast, 
the principles that currently govern compensation under investment treaties 
require a tribunal to determine the future scenario that would have existed if 
the restrictions had not been introduced.
95
Constructing a future counter-
factual of this sort requires a complex set of interlocking forecasts about the 
situation the investor would have been in but for the host state’s breach of 
the investment treaty. For this reason, answering the second question posed 
by our proposal will normally be simpler than the valuation exercise re-
quired to calculate compensation under existing jurisprudence.
In many situations that are controversial under existing jurisprudence, 
the outcome under our proposal is straightforward. Consider, for example, 
situations in which an investor would have proceeded with the investment 
even if the new domestic legal regime had been in place when the invest-
ment was made. Regulatory changes that reduce profitability of an invest-
ment without undermining its financial viability fall into this category.
96
In 
these cases, there is no relevant loss to the investor, as the investor is not left 
worse off than if it had decided not to invest in the first place. No compen-
sation is due under our proposal.
94. In situations where the state has breached the pre-existing domestic legal regime, 
the “new” domestic legal regime refers to a domestic legal regime that authorizes the conduct 
in question. In situations where the state has changed the pre-existing domestic legal regime, 
the “new” domestic legal regime refers, obviously, to the domestic legal regime after the 
change.
95. These precise circumstances were at issue in Vattenfall v. Germany I, but it is im-
portant to note that the Vattenfall I arbitration settled prior to any determination of the merits 
of the investor’s claim. As such, it is unclear whether the tribunal would have found a breach 
of the Energy Charter Treaty, requiring compensation. Vattenfall AB, v. Republic of Ger. (I), 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Award Embodying the Parties’ Settlement Agreement (Mar. 11, 
2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0890.pdf.
96. See discussion infra Section IV.C.2.ii.
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In other circumstances, the foreign investor would not have proceeded 
with the investment if the new domestic legal regime had been in place from 
the outset. This will normally be the case where a host state’s breach or 
change to its domestic legal regime leads to the termination of an invest-
ment. It will also be the case in some situations in which the investment 
continues to operate, insofar as breach or change to the domestic legal re-
gime makes it impossible for the investor to recover the capital it initially 
invested. In both situations, our second question is equivalent to the stand-
ard of “reliance damages” in contract law
97
—i.e. compensation is the 
amount the investor has lost by investing in reliance on the domestic legal 
regime in place at the time that the investment was made. This loss is equal 
to the amount originally invested by the investor adjusted to include the cost 
of capital, minus revenue income earned from the operation of the invest-
ment. Interest would be calculated on the basis of the investor’s cost of capi-
tal. This standard for calculating compensation is within arbitrators’ experi-
ence. Several investment treaty tribunals have calculated compensation on 
the basis of an investor’s sunk costs,
98
 in circumstances where there was in-
sufficient evidence to support the complex set of interlocking forecasts nec-
essary to award compensation on a “but for” basis.
99
 
The third question concerns the amount that the host state has gained 
from not having had the new domestic legal regime in place at the time that 
the investment was made. This is equivalent to one the methods for deter-
mining the “restitution interest” in contract law.
100
 Under this conception of 
 
 97. See Shavell, supra note 85, at 471. 
 98. See Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A.  v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶¶ 8.3.3–8.3.13 (Aug. 20, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/ita0215.pdf;); Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 590, 633 (Nov. 30, 2017), 30 World Trade & Arb. Materials 
5 (2018). 
 99. See SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 206–07 (2008) (citing Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. 
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶¶ 124–125 (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 
I.L.M. 933 (2002); Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004); S. Pac. Props. 
Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Award (May 20, 1992), 32 
I.L.M. 1470 (1993)); see also Louis Wells, Double Dipping in Arbitration Awards? An Econ-
omist Questions Damages Awarded to Khara Bodas Company in Indonesia 19 ARB. INT’L 
471, 475 (2003). 
 100. According to the restatements, one measure “of money . . . awarded to protect a 
party’s restitution interest,” is “the extent to which the other party’s property has been in-
creased in value or his other interests advanced.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 
371(b) (Am. Law Inst. 1981). For an example, see Bush v. Canfield 2 Conn. 485 (Conn. 
1818). In contract law, calculation of compensation on a restitutionary basis is normally used 
when expectation damages are judged to be insufficient. This differs from our proposal, which 
will almost inevitably lead to lower awards of compensation than would be the case under the 
principle of full reparation. 
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restitution “the defaulting party returns only the payments made to him.”
101
This is the most innovative aspect of our proposal, as compensation is rarely 
awarded on a restitution basis in international law.
102
The third question only arises if the first two questions have been an-
swered affirmatively—i.e. if the host state has breached or changed the do-
mestic legal regime, and the investor has suffered a loss due to the state not 
having had the new domestic legal regime in place when the investment was 
made. The answer to this third question is based on comparison to the same 
counter-factual used to answer the second question, which considerably 
simplifies the inquiry. The difference is that the third question concerns the 
host state’s gain, rather than the investor’s loss, relative to this counter-
factual. As with the second question, the evidence required to answer the 
third question can be found in the historical record. Relevant evidence will 
include documentation of amounts actually paid to the state in order to ob-
tain permits and concessions, as well as valuation of any assets or resources 
transferred into state ownership during the lifespan of the investment.
103
Once the value of the relevant gain to the host state is determined, interest 
would be calculated on the basis of the host’s cost of capital and applied 
from the date at which the gain was obtained until the date the award is 
paid, to reflect the time value of money.
The inquiry necessary to answer the third question illustrates the under-
lying logic of our rule—namely, protecting investors from legal change only 
insofar as is necessary to solve problems of time inconsistency for the host 
state. Consider, for example, the case of Bilcon v. Canada. The case con-
cerned an investor’s proposal to build and operate a gravel quarry in the 
province of Nova Scotia. The investor claimed that it was originally encour-
aged to proceed with project by the provincial authorities and spent several 
million dollars developing its proposal.
104
However, many members of the 
101. Shavell, supra note 85, at 471.
102. Confusingly, the term “restitution” is also used in international law as shorthand for 
an order of restitution of property—e.g., transfer of property back to a claimant following an
illegal expropriation. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art. 34 (Oct. 24, 2001); see, e.g., Factory at 
Chorzów (Ger. V. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 17, at 43 (Sept. 13). An order for restitution 
of property should be clearly distinguished from calculation of compensation on the basis of 
restitution, as the term is used in contract law. The latter is focused on determining the amount 
that the defaulting party has gained, independently of the question of how much the innocent 
party has lost.
103. In our companion paper, the superior efficiency and equity properties of our rule 
were proven, assuming that gain was net of losses and that both losses and gains were broadly 
defined to include everything from tax revenue to social and environmental costs and benefits. 
See, e.g., Aisbett & Bonnitcha, supra note 12, at 22 (analyzing Case 3c). Later in this paper, 
we provide examples of how these principles could be operationalized in investment disputes 
as a practical matter. See infra Section IV.C.2.ii.
104. Bilcon of Del., Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Permanent Ct. of Arb. [PCA] Case No. 2009-
04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 455–471 (2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw4212.pdf.
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local community opposed the project and, partly for this reason, the Canadi-
an environmental review process refused to grant the permission necessary 
for the project to go ahead.
105
The tribunal held that this decision was made in breach of Canadian en-
vironmental law, meaning that Canada’s action is potentially compensable 
under our proposal. As to the second question, if Canadian environmental 
law had clearly precluded the project from going ahead prior to the time at 
which Bilcon began its development activities, it seems clear that the inves-
tor would not have spent its money pursuing the project. As such, the inves-
tor suffered a potentially compensable loss under our proposal. However, 
turning to the third question, there is no evidence that Canada gained any-
thing from Bilcon’s pre-development activities, so no compensation is due. 
This is a situation where the investor has suffered a loss due to the changing 
political priorities of the host state, not a case of opportunistic action where 
a state has encouraged an investment and then “changed the rules” so as to 
acquire the value of the investment. (The outcome under our proposal would 
be different if Canada had sold Bilcon the right to build a quarry on a par-
ticular location, and subsequently refused to grant permission for the devel-
opment to proceed.)
2. Some Further Case Examples
In this section we explore the practical implications of our proposal, us-
ing a series of well-known investment treaty disputes as examples. Follow-
ing our companion paper, we divide our discussion between cases in which 
state conduct completely destroys an investment, and cases in which state 
conduct leads to a partial reduction in the value of an investment that con-
tinues to operate.
i. Cases Involving Expropriation and/or Permanent Shut-Down of an 
Investment
Under our proposal, compensation will not necessarily be required for 
state conduct that shuts-down or entirely eviscerates an investment. This is 
one important difference between our proposal and existing investment trea-
ties. Consider the case of Metalclad v. Mexico. Metalclad had purchased a 
site in Mexico on which to build a hazardous waste landfill. It obtained the 
permits to operate the landfill from both state and federal agencies and had 
been told by federal officials that it did not need any additional authoriza-
tions. When construction was well underway, the municipality issued a stop 
work order, claiming that a municipal construction permit was also required. 
The municipality ultimately refused to grant the permit and, despite having 
been completed in the interim, the landfill could not begin operation. The 
105. Id. ¶¶ 502–506.
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municipality’s action appears to have been in breach of Mexican law.
106
But, 
for the tribunal, the two decisive factors were that Metalclad had been led to 
believe that it was not required to obtain a construction permit, and that mu-
nicipality’s stop work order had then completely destroyed the value of its 
investment.
107
Under our proposal the threshold question is whether the municipality’s
conduct was consistent with Mexican law. It appears that it was not. The 
second question is whether Metalclad suffered any loss compared to the sit-
uation that would have existed if the Mexican legal system had prohibited 
the investment from the outset. Clearly, Metalclad did suffer such a loss—
specifically, the expense of constructing the facility that it unable to recover. 
This was the basis on which compensation was actually awarded in that 
case.
108
Nevertheless, Metalclad’s claim fails to satisfy the third test imposed 
by our proposal, as Mexico did not obtain any benefit from not having pro-
hibited the investment from the outset. In proceeding with the investment, 
Metalclad did not make any payment to Mexican government entities or 
contribute to the provision of any public infrastructure subsequently repur-
posed by Mexico. Mexico did not acquire ownership of any of Metalclad’s
assets, such as the landfill site, the ownership of which was retained by 
Metalclad.
109
As such, no compensation would be due under our proposal.
110
Lawyers for investor-claimants might be tempted to argue that an inves-
tor’s expenditure within the territory of a host state constitutes a “gain” to 
that state by virtue of its effect in stimulating the local economy. The argu-
ment, in this case, would be that Mexican economy benefited from the mon-
ey Metalclad spent constructing the facility. However, such expenditure di-
verts productive resources, including labor, from other economic activities. 
In order to make a case, on the facts, that Metalclad’s expenditure in itself
constituted a gain for the host state, the investor would need to show that the 
employment generated was additive, for example by showing that the em-
ployees were paid more than their alternative wage or income, or that the 
106. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Award, ¶ 86 (Aug. 30, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001).
107. Id. ¶¶ 81–86, 103.
108. Id. ¶ 122.
109. Id. ¶ 127
110. This example illustrates one important difference between our proposal and an ear-
lier proposal made by Newcombe, supra note 46. Newcombe has argued that regulatory ex-
propriation jurisprudence under investment treaties should be organized around the concept of 
appropriation. Although his terminology appears similar to ours, he would treat the cancella-
tion of a license or permit as a “quasi-appropriation” requiring compensation because “the 
state is essentially reacquiring rights that it can use or grant to another party in the future.”
Newcombe, supra note 46, at 19, 22. Unlike our proposal, his analysis does not depend on 
whether the investor had to pay the state to acquire the license or permit in question. The dif-
ference between our approaches stems from the fact that our argument is grounded in an eco-
nomic analysis of the problem of time inconsistency, whereas his argument is animated by 
concerns of fairness to the investor. Newcombe, supra note 46, at 55.
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income tax collected was higher than if the project not taken place. The 
compensation due would then be the difference between the actual wages 
and taxes paid and the economic situation that would have existed in the ab-
sence of the investor’s expenditure. As a conceptual point, any such “gain” 
to the host state will necessarily be less than the amount actually expended 
by the investor. As a practical point, investors bear the evidentiary burden of 
substantiating their claims in investment treaty arbitration,
111
 so such argu-
ments would only be likely to succeed in situations where an investor can 
adduce specific and concrete evidence its wasted expenditure in pursuing an 
investment created benefits for the host state’s economy. 
Insofar as compensation is required for the shut-down of an investment 
under our proposal, the amount of compensation required will invariably be 
lower than is the case under currently existing investment treaties. Al 
Kharifi v. Libya provides a simple illustration. The dispute in this case con-
cerned a 2006 agreement between a foreign investor and Libya for the in-
vestor to build and operate a new hotel. From the description of the facts in 
the award, it seems that the investor had spent $5 million U.S. dollars 
(“USD”) over four years pursuing the project before it was cancelled by 
Libya in 2010.
112
 This included an initial payment of $130,000 U.S. dollars 
(“USD”) to the Libyan Treasury.
113
 Even though construction of the project 
never commenced, the arbitral tribunal awarded $900 million USD to the 
investor on the basis that, if Libya had not cancelled the project, the invest-
ment would have been highly profitable for the investor for the eighty-two 
year period of the investment’s proposed duration.
114
 (In June 2020, the 
award was annulled by Egyptian courts, due to the disproportionate amount 
of compensation awarded.)
115
 Under our proposal, compensation would also 
be due as a result of Libya’s breach of the underlying project agreement. 
But the amount of compensation would be the lesser of the investor’s pre-
development expenditures and the investor’s payment to Libya—i.e. 
$130,000 USD. Interest and would run from the date the investor made the 
payment to the Libyan Treasury until the award was paid, with the interest 
rate set at Libya’s cost of capital. 
 
 111. For discussion of a party’s evidentiary burden to prove the facts on which its claim 
rests, see FRÉDÉRIC GILLES SOURGENS, KABIR DUGGAL & IAN A. LAIRD, EVIDENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION  26–28 (2018). 
 112. See Al-Kharafi & Sons Co. v. Libya, Award, 367–68 (Cairo Reg’l Ctr. For Int’l 
Com. Arb, 2013), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1554.pdf. 
 113. Id. at 18. 
 114. Id. at 382. An additional complication in this case is that it was argued on the basis 
that the Libya had breached both the relevant investment treaty (the Unified Agreement for 
the Investment of Arab Capital) and the underlying investment contract with the investor. For 
this reason, the tribunal argued that it had “discretion” in determining the amount of compen-
sation, and then relied on principles of Libyan law to justify its approach. See id. at 364–65. 
 115. Mah. Kamat al-Isti’n f [Court of Appeal], Cairo, Judgment No. 39, session of 3 
June 2020, year 130 (Egypt). 
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One important feature of our rule is that it does not require tribunals to 
assess the strength or validity of public policy justifications for the host 
state’s conduct. Consider the case of Crystallex v. Venezuela. In that case, 
the foreign investor had made a series of payments to the Venezuelan gov-
ernment and to a Venezuelan state-owned enterprise to acquire mining 
rights for the Las Christinas site. Venezuelan authorities subsequently re-
jected the investor’s application to develop the site citing “concerns for the 
environment and the indigenous people of the Imataca Forest Reserve.”
116
The arbitral tribunal found that Venezuela’s action breached the investment 
treaty. Even though the mine was never built, the tribunal awarded the in-
vestor $1.2 billion USD in compensation, reflecting the tribunal’s estimate 
of the likely value of the mine if it had been allowed to go ahead.
Our proposal would also require compensation in this situation due to 
Venezuela’s apparent breach of its own legal regime,
117
regardless of the va-
lidity of the environmental and indigenous concerns that Venezuela cited to 
justify the measure. However, the amount of compensation due would be 
the lesser of Crystallex’s loss from having made the investment and Vene-
zuela’s gains arising from Crystallex’s investment (including gains to Vene-
zuelan state-owned entities). The tribunal did not quantify either amount, as 
neither is decisive under existing jurisprudence.
The tribunal did, however, indicate that Crystallex’s investment related-
expenses fell in the range between $200 million USD (Venezuela’s esti-
mate) and $645 million USD (Crystallex’s estimate).
118
The tribunal also 
identified all the elements necessary to value the benefit of Crystallex’s in-
vestment activity to Venezuela. These were the $15 million USD that 
Crystallex paid to the Venezuela state-owned enterprise to acquire the Las 
Christinas mining rights,119 the unspecified amounts Crystallex paid to Ven-
ezuela as a bond and in environmental taxes,
120
and the value to Venezuela 
of public infrastructure, including a medical center that Crystallex con-
structed under the project agreement.
121
From this description of the facts, 
the benefit of Crystallex’s investment activity to Venezuela was almost cer-
tainly less than Crystallex’s losses arising from its investment related-
116. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)
/11/2, Award, ¶ 44 (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw7194.pdf.
117. In order to decide whether Venezuela had breached the investment treaty, the 
Crystallex tribunal engaged in an elaborate analysis of the investor’s expectations. It did not 
directly answer the simpler question of whether Venezuela’s rejection of the investor’s appli-
cation breached its own legal regime. But, insofar as the tribunal touched on the question, it 
appears that there Venezuela did breach its own legal regime governing the evaluation and
approval of mining permit applications. See, e.g., id. ¶ 614.
118. Id. ¶¶ 912–913.
119. Id. ¶ 18.
120. Id. ¶ 245.
121. Id. ¶ 194.
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expenses, meaning that compensation under our proposal would be the for-
mer. Either way, on these facts, our proposal leads to compensation vastly 
lower than that currently required under investment treaties.
ii.  Cases Involving Interference with Investments that Continue to 
Operate
One attractive feature of our proposal is that it provides a simple way to 
resolve complex—and often highly controversial—regulatory disputes re-
lating to foreign investment. Consider the example of Philip Morris v. Aus-
tralia. As is well known, the dispute concerned a change to Australia’s do-
mestic legal regime: the introduction of a law mandating plain packaging 
for tobacco products. Philip Morris’s central argument was that this regula-
tory change was arbitrary and unjustified, in the sense that it was unlikely to 
reduce tobacco consumption.
122
The case was dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds, so the tribunal never decided whether Australia’s conduct would 
have breached the investment treaty.
123
Under our proposal, the threshold question is whether there was a 
change in Australia’s legal regime after Philip Morris invested in Australia. 
The answer is clearly yes (leaving aside complications arising from the re-
structuring of Philip Morris business that ultimately led to the claim being 
dismissed).
124
The second question is whether Philip Morris suffered a loss 
compared to the situation that would have existed if Australia had had to-
bacco plain packaging rules in force prior to the time at which Philip Morris 
first established its Australian operations. The answer to this question is 
clearly “no.” The sale of tobacco products in Australia remained a highly 
profitable business, even after the introduction of the new law mandating 
plain packaging.
125
This demonstrates that Philip Morris would have invest-
ed anyway, even if the new laws had been in place from the outset and, 
therefore, that there was no relevant loss to the investor. Under our pro-
posal, no compensation is due, independently of an inquiry into the strength 
of the public health justification offered by Australia for its legal change.
Nevertheless, there will be circumstances where our proposal requires 
compensation for interferences with investments that continue to operate. 
The series of disputes arising from changes to the regulatory regime govern-
122. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Austl., PCA Case No. 
2012-12, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 7.7 (2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0665.pdf.
123. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-12, 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 588 (2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf.
124. For a summary, see id. ¶¶ 141–164.
125. See Michelle Scollo & Megan Bayly, The Manufacturing And Wholesaling Industry 
In Australia—Major International Companies, in TOBACCO IN AUSTRALIA: FACTS AND 
ISSUES (M.M. Scollo & M.H. Winstanley eds., 2019), https://www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.au
/chapter-10-tobacco-industry/10-3-the-manufacturing-and-wholesaling-industry-in-australia.
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ing investments in solar power generation in Spain provide one example of 
a situation where compensation might be required under our rule. In the 
2000s, Spain established a regulatory regime with the aim of encouraging 
investment in renewable energy. Generators of renewable energy were giv-
en the choice between a fixed tariff or a premium over and above market 
tariff paid to other electricity providers.
126
 These tariffs were to be reviewed 
every four years, subject to the proviso that “a reasonable rate of profitabil-
ity shall always be guaranteed with reference to the cost of money in the 
capital markets.”
127
 The regime was more successful than anticipated in at-
tracting new investment in renewable energy. However, following the 2008 
financial crisis, demand for electricity in Spain fell sharply. As a result of 
these two factors, the “tariff deficit”—the gap between the amount the 
Spanish state was paying to purchase renewable electricity and the revenue 
that it could cover from the on-sale of that electricity for consumption—
increased to over €20 billion Euros.
128
 In response to domestic political pres-
sure for reform, as well as pressure from the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Commission,
129
 Spain dismantled the existing regulatory 
regime in a series of steps. In the final step, from 2013, existing renewable 
energy generators were paid only the market price for electricity, plus an 
additional Special Payment (subsidy) benchmarked according to the costs of 
building and operating an efficient renewable energy plant and intended to 
ensure that such a plant would still be able to achieve a return of 7.398 per-
cent per annum over its life cycle.
130
 
These regulatory changes have led to over forty ISDS claims against 
Spain.
131
 Many of these cases remain pending. Of those that have been re-
solved, investors have won eleven, while Spain has successfully defended 
three.
132
 Some of these differences in outcome can, arguably, be justified by 
differences in the factual specifics in the underlying cases.
133
 Others are ex-
 
 126. RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13
/30, Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, ¶ 109 (Nov. 30, 2018), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10455_0.pdf. 
 127. Id. ¶ 114. 
 128. Id. ¶ 116. 
 129. Tobias Buck, Spanish Energy Reforms Slash Subsidies to Suppliers, FIN. TIMES 
(July 13, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/a7e539a8-eb0c-11e2-bfdb-00144feabdc0. 
 130. RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Ltd v. Kingdom of Spain., ICSID Case No. ARB/13
/30, Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, ¶¶ 132–141. 
 131. See Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator: Spain Cases as Respondent State, 
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-
settlement/country/197/spain/investor (last visited Nov. 8, 2020). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Yulia S Selivanova, Changes in Renewables Support Policy and Investment Protec-
tion Under the Energy Charter Treaty: Analysis of Jurisprudence and Outlook for the Current 
Arbitration Cases, 33 ICSID REV. 433, 451 (2018) (comparing Isolux Neth. BV v. Kingdom 
of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, Final Award (2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw9219.pdf, with Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, 
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amples of divergent outcomes on substantially identical facts.
134
The differ-
ences between the outcomes in the cases that have been decided to date turn 
largely on tribunals’ assessment of the “legitimate expectations” of the in-
vestor in question and on the tribunals’ views about whether the regulatory 
changes were “reasonable.”
135
In those cases where investors have succeed-
ed, tribunals have had to evaluate complex financial evidence to determine 
the amount of compensation due under existing jurisprudence.
Our proposal provides a better way to resolve such cases. The first 
question is whether Spain changed the domestic legal regime governing ex-
isting solar investments. The answer is clearly “yes.” The second question 
concerns the loss that the investor in question suffered compared to the situ-
ation that would have existed if the new subsidy regime had been in place 
from the time at which it made its investment. This loss is equal to the 
amount originally invested by the investor adjusted to include the cost of 
capital over the operating life cycle of the project, minus the operating in-
come that the investment generated both before and after the new regime 
was introduced.
Although most of the Spanish solar tribunals to date have—consistently 
with existing jurisprudence—calculated compensation according to the 
principle of “full reparation,”
136
the tribunal in RREEF v. Spain held that 
compensation should be calculated in order to ensure that the investor ob-
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Final Award (May 4, 2017), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid
/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3286/DS14433_En.pdf).
134. Lisa Bohmer, Analysis: Majority in Stadtwerke Munchen v. Spain Considers That 
Investors in Spanish CSP Plants Could Not Legitimately Expect Legislative Stability; Kaj 
Hober Disagrees, INV. ARB. REP. (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.iareporter.com/articles
/analysis-majority-in-stadtwerke-munchen-v-spain-considers-that-investors-in-spanish-csp-
plants-could-not-legitimately-expect-legislative-stability-kaj-hober-disagrees/ (comparing 
Stadtwerke München GmbH v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/1, Award (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw11056.pdf, with OperaFund 
Eco-Invest SICAV PLC v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/36, Award (Sept. 6, 2019), http:
//icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C4806/DS12832_En.pdf, Nex-
tEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/11, Final Award (May 
31, 2019), 31 World Trade & Arb. Materials 987 (2019), and Foresight Lux. Solar 1 S.à.r.l. v. 
Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/150, Final Award (2018), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw10142.pdf).
135. See, e.g., 9REN Holding S.à.r.l. v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/15, Award, ¶¶ 
212–216 (May 31, 2019), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw10565.pdf; Isabella Reynoso, Spain’s Renewable Energy Saga: Lessons for Interna-
tional Law and Sustainable Development, INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/en/2019/06/27/spains-renewable-energy-saga-lessons-for-
international-investment-law-and-sustainable-development-isabella-reynoso/.
136. Novenergia II—Energy and Env’t (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Lux.), SICAR v. King-
dom of Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, Final Arbitral Award, 30 World Trade & Arb. Mate-
rials 947, ¶¶ 803–847 (2018).
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tained a reasonable rate of return.
137
To perform these calculations, the 
RREEF tribunal assessed the investor’s initial expenditure, determined the 
cost of capital, added an additional increment to allow the investor some ex-
cess profit to arrive at a reasonable rate of return, and then determined the 
extent to which the new regulatory regime failed to ensure this rate of return 
on an ongoing basis.
138
The RREEF tribunal’s analysis illustrates that the in-
quiry required by our second question is feasible, as a practical matter. 
However, one difference between our approach and that adopted by the tri-
bunal in RREEF is that our approach would take the very generous returns 
that investors earned prior to the change in the regulatory regime into ac-
count.
139
Another is that our approach relies on the cost of capital only; 
compensation should not include any allowance for excess profitability over 
and above the cost of capital.
The third question under our approach concerns Spain’s gain from not 
having had the new regime in place. This question draws attention to an im-
portant conceptual challenge facing existing jurisprudence. In the case of 
RREEF v. Spain, for example, the investor-claimant was not the company 
that had originally constructed the solar plants. Rather, the claimant in the 
case was an asset-manager that had purchased a stake in solar plants several 
years after construction, having been attracted by the above-market returns 
available in that sector under the original regulatory regime.
140
In RREEF,
this factual quirk led to the bizarre outcome that the claimant (the asset-
manager) likely obtained more in compensation than the original investor 
would have obtained in the same case, on account of the fact that the asset-
manager paid more to buy the investment than the investment had initially 
cost to build. There is no plausible policy justification for such an outcome.
The third question in our proposal deals with this problem in a straight-
forward way, by focusing on the gain that the host state has obtained from 
not having had the new regulatory regime in place when the initial invest-
ment was made.
141
Conceptually, there is a gain to the state if it induced the 
137. See RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB
/13/30, Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, ¶ 515 (Nov. 30, 2018), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10455_0.pdf.
138. Id. ¶¶ 567–591 (detailing this methodology). Some of the final calculations carry 
over to RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 
Award, ¶ 19 (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw10455_0.pdf.
139. This follows from the fact that our inquiry seeks to measure the loss the investor 
has suffered compared to the situation that would have existed if the new, less generous, re-
gime had been in place from the time at which the investment was made. Cf. RREEF Infra-
structure (G.P.) Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, Decision on Respon-
sibility and on the Principles of Quantum, ¶ 590 (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.italaw.com
/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10455_0.pdf.
140. Id. ¶¶ 142–177.
141. If the new regulatory regime had been in place when the asset-manager was con-
templating buying the solar plants from the original, there is no doubt that the sale would not 
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investment by offering a generous regulatory regime before switching to a 
less generous regime after the initial investor had incurred the significant 
sunk costs involved in building the solar plants. As a practical matter, the 
value of that gain to the state is the value of the renewable energy obtained 
from the investment, less the amount actually paid for that electricity, with 
both figures calculated over the operating life cycle of the investment. The 
value of the renewable electricity is the amount it would have cost an effi-
cient operator to produce that electricity using the technology in question at 
the time the investment was made. These calculations could be performed 
using information that is readily available to arbitral tribunals—specifically, 
cost data from other operators in the solar industry. Indeed, it seems that 
Spain actually led evidence in several of the arbitrations relating to the cost 
structure of efficient solar plants, as this benchmark was one of the princi-
ples underpinning both the original and the new regulatory regimes.
142
While investor-claimants took the view that these figures underestimated 
the costs facing real plants,
143
this is a debate that could have been resolved 
through further evidence. In several of the Spanish solar cases it is likely 
that gain to the host state calculated in this way would be zero, meaning that 
no compensation would be due.
C.  Our Proposal Resolves Practical Challenges with Existing 
Jurisprudence
In Part IV.A, we showed that balancing, as a mode of reasoning, is cen-
tral to existing arbitral jurisprudence. This mode of reasoning requires tri-
bunals to evaluate the policy justifications for state conduct. While there are 
differences between balancing techniques, particularly as they relate to the 
level of deference shown to the host state’s own decision-making process,
144
existing tribunals are regularly drawn into controversial inquiries about 
states’ motives, and the purpose and effectiveness of measures that are sub-
ject to challenge.
have gone ahead. However, Spain gained nothing from that transaction. Therefore, treating 
this transaction as an “investment” would mean that no compensation is due. See id. ¶ 163.
142. Id. ¶ 542; Isolux Neth., BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, Final 
Award ¶ 134 (July 17, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw9219.pdf.
143. Selivanova, supra note 133, at 449.
144. For discussion of the appropriate level of deference in investment treaty arbitration, 
see generally William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public 
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. (2010); 
Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the 
Standard of Review Through Comparative Public Law (Soc’y Int’l Econ. L. 3rd Biennial 
Glob. Conf. Working Paper No. 2012/33, 2012); Anna T. Katselas, Do Investment Treaties 
Prescribe a Deferential Standard of Review, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 87 (2012); Caroline 
Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest: The Role of the Standard 
of Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor-State Arbitration 4 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 197 (2013).
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In contrast, our proposal does not require tribunals to resolve any of the 
questions that ordinarily arise within a balancing mode of reasoning. Under 
our proposal, inquiry into that state’s motive is not relevant, meaning that a 
tribunal is not required to unpick the decision-making process leading to the 
change in the domestic legal regime. This means that a tribunal is not re-
quired to determine whether the state is genuinely motivated by environ-
mental considerations in cases like Metalclad and Tecmed, discussed previ-
ously.
145
The objective of the state’s measure is not relevant, meaning that 
the tribunal is not required to take a view on which government purposes 
are legitimate.
146
This means, for example, that tribunals do not need to re-
solve debates within existing jurisprudence about if and, if so, when a state 
is entitled to change its domestic legal regime to reduce very high rates of 
profitability being obtained by operators in regulated industries or natural 
monopolies.
147
The effectiveness of the state’s measure is also not relevant under our 
proposal, meaning that the tribunal is not required to reassess the eviden-
tiary basis for the state’s conduct, or to come to a view about the reasona-
bleness of the state’s own assessment of the evidentiary basis. This would 
avoid the need for tribunals to resolve issues such as the disagreement be-
tween the majority and minority arbitrators in Philip Morris v. Uruguay
about whether Uruguay’s restrictions on marketing of brand variants of to-
bacco products had a sufficient evidentiary basis.
148
Finally, the balance a 
state has struck between competing interests is not relevant, meaning that 
the tribunal is not required to ascribe weights to competing policy objec-
tives, or to review the weighting of objectives implicit in state action. This 
would resolve the challenges faced by the tribunals in the Spanish solar cas-
es, discussed above, in determining how far Spain could legitimately alter 
145. See supra Section IV.b.2.i for discussion of Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed 
S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 43 
I.L.M. 133 (2004).
146. For the argument that existing jurisprudence requires tribunals to take a view, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, on which purposes are legitimate, see Allen S. Weiner, Indirect Expro-
priations: The Need for a Taxonomy of “Legitimate” Regulatory Purposes, 5 INT’L L.F. 166 
(2003).
147. For the view that host states are generally entitled to take action to reduce “excess 
profits,” see AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 
Award, ¶ 10.3.9 (Sep. 23, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS
/OnlineAwards/C114/DC1730_En.pdf. For the view that the provision of above market rates 
of return are “bait” to attract foreign investment that a state cannot then renounce, see No-
venergia II—Energy and Env’t (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Lux.), SICAR v. Kingdom of Spain, 
Arb. Inst. Of the Stockholm Chamber of Com. [SCC] Case No. 2015/063, Final Arbitral 
Award, 30 World Trade & Arb. Materials 947, ¶ 694 (2018). For discussion of these issues in 
other contexts, see Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 29.
148. Compare Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switz.) v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 305 (Jul. 8, 2016), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid
/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1000/DC9012_En.pdf, with id. ¶ 150 (Arb. Born, dissenting).
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the 2007 regulatory regime governing investment in solar power generation 
without incurring liability under investment treaties.
149
By removing the need for tribunals to evaluate the justifications for 
state conduct, our proposal resolves several challenges with existing juris-
prudence. First, there is the question of institutional competence. Almost all 
arbitrators are lawyers, and the majority of them have a background in pri-
vate, commercial practice. Many of the strongest criticisms of investment 
treaty arbitration in its current form focus on arbitrators’ suitability to pass 
judgment on complex questions of public policy.
150
Our proposal does not 
require arbitrators to answer such questions.
Second, there is the complexity of investment treaty arbitration, with 
associated implications for the expense and duration of proceedings.
151
Be-
cause balancing as a mode of reasoning invites argument about the policy 
justifications for state conduct, it significantly increases the complexity of 
proceedings. For example, in the course of its successful defense of its to-
bacco packaging law, Australia led evidence from twelve expert witnesses 
on issues such as the strength of the public health evidence supporting the 
law.
152
It cost Australia at least 23 million Australian Dollars to defend the 
claim (approximately $16 million USD), only half of which was ultimately 
reimbursed by the claimant as a result of the tribunal’s costs order.
153
If a state is found to have breached an investment treaty, further com-
plexity and associated cost arises in the determination of compensation. For 
example, in Crystallex v. Venezuela led evidence in relation to four different 
valuation methods which could be used to construct a future counter-factual 
against which the claimant’s loss could be measured. Each of these valua-
tion exercises was supported by underlying expert evidence and an associat-
149. For a similar argument, see Frederico Ortino, Investment Treaties, Sustainable De-
velopment and Reasonableness Review: A Case Against Strict Proportionality Balancing, 30
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 71 (2017).
150. GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); 
GUS VAN HARTEN, SOVEREIGN CHOICES AND SOVEREIGN CONSTRAINTS: JUDICIAL 
RESTRAINT IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION (2013); BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 1,
at 253–57.
151. For data on costs and duration of existing proceedings, see BONNITCHA ET AL., su-
pra note 1, at 87–91; Gabriel Bottini, Julien Chaisse, Marko Jovanovic, Facundo Pérez Aznar 
& Catherine Titi, Excessive Costs and Recoverability of Costs Awards in Investment Arbitra-
tion (Academic F. ISDS Concept Paper 2019/9, 2019); Anna De Luca, Crina Baltag, Daniel 
Behn, Holger Hestermeyer, Gregory Shaffer, Jonathan Bonnitcha, José Manuel Alvarez-
Zarate, Loukas Mistelis, Malcolm Langford, Clara López Rodríquez & Simon Weber, Dura-
tion of ISDS Proceedings (Academic F. ISDS Concept Paper 2020/1, 2020).
152. Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-
12, Final Award Regarding Costs, ¶ 86 (P.C.A. July 8, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/cases
/851.
153. Jarrod Hepburn, Final Costs Details are Released in Philip Morris v. Australia Fol-
lowing Request by IAReporter, INT’L ARB. REP. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.iareporter.com
/articles/final-costs-details-are-released-in-philip-morris-v-australia-following-request-by-
iareporter/.
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ed financial model. It cost Crystallex $30 million USD to litigate the case.
154
In Tethyan Copper v. Pakistan the claimant spent $4.5 million USD on fi-
nancial experts and $17.5 million USD on legal fees for the compensation 
phase of proceedings alone.
155
Pakistan spent almost $10 million USD de-
fending the compensation phase, including both financial experts and legal 
fees.
156
Our proposal removes the complexity, expense and uncertainty asso-
ciated with evaluation of the policy justifications for state conduct. It also 
simplifies the quantification of compensation by making compensation re-
ferrable to a past counter-factual, rather than a future counter-factual.
Third, there is an issue that has received less attention. Because existing 
jurisprudence on investment treaties maintains a sharp distinction between 
the treaties’ substantive protections and the principles governing compensa-
tion, the application of existing treaties creates a “knife edge” of liability. A 
state that only just fails to meet the threshold set by existing substantive pro-
tections must pay full compensation, whereas a state that just satisfies the 
threshold pays nothing. This is a significant practical concern for states, 
given that the determination of whether state conduct breaches treaty protec-
tions like FET turns on ex post judgments that are difficult to predict in ad-
vance.
157
Other proposed modifications to the existing regime, such as the 
inclusion of exception provisions to clarify that certain forms of regulatory 
conduct are non-compensable, have the same “knife-edge” quality.
158
In 
contrast, compensation under our proposal varies according to the extent 
that the underlying structure of state conduct reflects the problem of time 
inconsistency.
154. An unknown portion of this figure related to the quantification of compensation. 
Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, 
Award, ¶ 949 (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw7194.pdf.
155. Tethyan Copper Co. Pty Ltd. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/12
/1, Award, ¶ 1824 (July 12, 2019), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw10737.pdf.
156. Id. ¶ 1831.
157. For example, in the course of finding that Spain’s alteration of the regulatory re-
gime governing investment in solar energy breached the Energy Charter Treaty, that tribunal 
in 9REN specifically acknowledged that this outcome would have been uncertain for investors 
considering the issue prospectively. 9REN Holding S.à.r.l. v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15
/15, Award, ¶ 412 (May 31, 2019), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw10565.pdf. For a similar argument in a different context, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1702–07 (1988).
158. For example, treaty annexes clarifying the concept of indirect expropriation, still 
require an ultimate judgement about whether there a measure amounts to indirect expropria-
tion, in which case full compensation is required, or whether the measure does not amount to 
indirect expropriation, in which case no compensation is required. The same is also true of 
proposals for treaties to include clearly drafted exceptions provisions, such as van Aaken, su-
pra note 21, at 526–27; Caroline Henckels, Should Investment Treaties Contain Public Policy 
Exceptions?, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2825, 2843 (2018).
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For similar reasons, our proposal also addresses the three challenges 
with previous attempts at operationalizing the use/regulation distinction 
identified in Part III. Recall that Rubenfeld’s and van Aaken’s proposal are 
based on either/or characterizations of state conduct. Although we agree that 
there is a crucial conceptual distinction between time inconsistency (oppor-
tunism or use of property) and new information (regulation of property), we 
recognize that the two problems are often intertwined in complex factual 
scenarios. Our proposal is designed to avoid the challenges that come from 
having to characterize a particular instance of state conduct in an either/or 
way. This avoids related difficult evidentiary issues common both to exist-
ing jurisprudence and to other attempts to operationalize the use/regulation 
distinction.
159
For example, in a series of notorious disputes arising from 
changes made to the legal regime governing investment in the Argentinian 
gas industry following the Argentine financial crises in 2001, tribunals took 
different views on the extent to which such financial crises were foreseeable 
at the time that the investments were made.
160
Our proposal does not require 
a tribunal to determine the extent to which such crises were foreseeable. Ra-
ther, our rule is designed in such way that compensation is calibrated to 
provide redress only to the extent that a state’s action is opportunistic, in an 
objective sense.
V. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND DEMOCRATIC ARGUMENTS FOR OUR 
PROPOSAL
Up to this point, we have taken the analysis of our companion paper as 
providing the foundational economic rationale for our proposal. The com-
panion paper shows that, unlike well-known alternatives considered in the 
law and economics literature, our proposal guarantees improvements in both 
host and home state welfare compared to a situation in which there is no in-
vestment treaty. In order to keep concepts clear, the analysis of our compan-
ion paper is deliberately parsimonious. Alternative legal arrangements are 
evaluated solely according to their welfare effects, and the analysis of their 
159. Van Aaken proposes a different solution, whereby the challenges of verifying 
whether new information is genuinely “new” mean that the issue should be left to the state in 
question through the use of self-judging exceptions. van Aaken, supra note 21, at 526. The 
challenge with this solution is that a state that is acting opportunistically can also be expected 
to assert the applicability of available exceptions. Such a solution fails to provide protection to 
investment in those circumstances when it is needed most.
160. In CMS Gas v Argentina, Award, the tribunal held that the risk of financial crises 
leading to currency valuation were foreseeable and actually foreseen by the parties. CMS Gas 
Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Final 
Award, ¶ 225 (May 12, 2005) 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005). In LG&E v Argentina, the tribunal took 
the view that the profound economic crisis in Argentina 2001-2002 went far beyond normal 
‘economic problems’ or ‘business cycle fluctuations’ and threatened the total collapse of the 
Argentinian state. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 231–257 (Oct. 3, 2007) 46 I.L.M. 36 (2006).
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welfare effects is based on an economic model that incorporates standard 
simplifying assumptions from the law and economics literature about the 
host state’s decision-making. Specifically, the model in our companion pa-
per is based on the assumptions that:
1. that the host state maximizes national welfare by weighing 
the impact of measures under consideration on various na-
tional constituencies accurately and equally; and
2. the host state is totally indifferent to the impact of its deci-
sions on foreign investors.
These simplifying assumptions are not necessarily realistic and tend to over-
state the need for the protection that investment treaties provide. In Part V.A
below, we focus on problems with the first assumption, and their implica-
tions for our proposal. In Part V.B we examine problems with the second 
assumption, and their implications. Taken together, these sections show that 
integrating a more realistic account of government decision-making into our 
model further strengthens the case for our proposal over the status quo un-
der investment treaties. In Part V.C, we suggest that investment treaties’
implications for democratic decision-making should be considered. We ar-
gue there are strong democratic arguments for preferring our proposal to the 
status quo.
A.  Our Proposal’s Ability to Generate Global Welfare Improvement is 
Robust to Variation in Assumptions about the Host State’s Decision-
Making Function
There is a large body of scholarship, spanning several disciplines, that 
suggests that government decision-making does not necessarily maximize 
national welfare. This body of scholarship includes work by political econ-
omists arguing that concentrated domestic interests tend to have greater in-
fluence on policy-making than diffuse interests;
161
work by political scien-
tists on the extent to which politicians use control of the state apparatus to 
favor their own supporters;
162
work by sociologists on the role of policy 
elites in shaping state conduct;
163
and work by socio-legal scholars on how 
front-line bureaucrats make decisions within legal constraints.
164
As well as 
161. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS (Mancur Olson ed., 1965); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Help-
man, Protection for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 833 (1994).
162. See Andrew Harris & Daniel Posner, (Under What Conditions) Do Politicians Re-
ward Their Supporters? Evidence from Kenya’s Constituencies Development Fund, 113 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 123 (2019).
163. Janine Wedel, From Power Elites to Influence Elites: Resetting Elite Studies for the 
21st Century, 34 THEORY CULTURE & SOC. 153 (2017).
164. Simon Halliday, Jonathan Ilan & Colin Scott, The Public Management of Liability 
Risks, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 527 (2011); Lael R. Keiser, Understanding Street-Level 
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raising doubts about whether government decision-making necessarily max-
imizes national welfare, this body of scholarship suggests that any single 
theory will struggle to account for the diversity in decision-making between 
various organs government across states that vary in their history, size, in-
come and institutional arrangements.
165
These concerns are particularly acute in the context of investment trea-
ties for two reasons. First, investment treaties apply to a variety of states, 
both developed and developing; they apply to states with democratic forms 
of government, autocracies, and every other possible form of in between.
166
Second, investment treaties apply to the conduct of all state organs: national 
and sub-national levels of government, parliaments, presidents, ministers, 
and specialized regulatory agencies. Because the decision-making of differ-
ent organs of government in different states can be expected to vary, it is 
important to consider how our proposal performs under diverse assumptions 
about government decision-making.
1.  Investment Treaties as Applied to Government Actors that Ignore 
Them
We first consider a variation to our initial assumptions in which deci-
sion-makers within the state apparatus ignore the risk of liability under an 
investment treaty. This is a realistic model of government decision-making 
in at least in some circumstances. Empirical scholarship on the impact of 
investment treaties on government decision-making suggests a very low 
level of awareness of the constraints imposed by the treaties across govern-
ments in some developing countries.
167
In other cases, government decision-
makers have been aware but apparently indifferent to the risk of liability 
under investment treaties, because the decision-maker adopting the measure 
Bureaucrats’ Decision Making: Determining Eligibility in the Social Security Disability Pro-
gram 70 PUB. ADM. REV. 247 (2010).
165. See David Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Alloca-
tion of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
166. Aside from a handful of micro-states, Brazil is the only state that is not bound by 
any investment treaties containing ISDS provisions. Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator,
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-
dispute-settlement (last visited May 27, 2020).
167. MAVLUDA SATTOROVA, THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATY LAW ON HOST 
STATES (Hart Publishing, 1st ed. 2018); Emma Aisbett, Matthias Busse & Peter Nunnenkamp, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties as Deterrents of Host-Country Discretion: The Impact of Inves-
tor-State Disputes on Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries 154 REV. WORLD 
ECON. 119, 121–22 (2018); Jonathan Bonnitcha, The Impact of Investment Treaties on Do-
mestic Governance in Myanmar, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND 
ARBITRATION ACROSS ASIA 335, 336–37 (Julien Chaisse & Luke Nottage eds., 2018) (on file 
with author).
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did not bear the cost of paying compensation for breach of the investment 
treaty.
168
When the host state ignores the risk of liability under an investment 
treaty, the treaties’ global welfare impacts depend solely on their effect on 
foreign investors’ decision-making.
169
An investor considering making an 
investment will consider the probability of adverse state conduct along with 
the amount of compensation it will receive in the event of such conduct and 
invest only if the project is expected to be profitable having taken into ac-
count these risks. Although our proposal does not reduce the likelihood of 
adverse state conduct, it does reduce the financial risk that opportunistic 
government conduct poses to the investor compared to a situation in which 
there is no investment treaty. This makes more projects under consideration 
profitable for the investor, and more investment occurs. As such, our rule 
creates benefits for investors. The increase in investment induced by our 
proposal also benefits the host state, regardless of whether the state ends up 
interfering with particular investments. This is because the principles gov-
erning compensation under our proposal ensure that, in the case of each and 
every investment, the host state can never be left worse off than if the in-
vestment were not made. As such, the Pareto improving, and hence global 
welfare improving, property of our rule is robust to the situation in which 
actual decision-makers within the government apparatus of the host state 
ignore the risk of having to pay compensation under investment treaties.
2. Investment Treaties and States That are Not Benevolent
As a second variation, we consider a situation in which the host state’s
decision-making function fully internalizes the costs and benefits of conduct 
under consideration to the state itself, but undervalues the effects of its con-
duct on other domestic constituencies. This variation inverts some of the as-
sumptions of our first variation, yet is also is a realistic model of govern-
ment decision-making in at least in some circumstances. It is consistent with 
scholarship that posits the existence of “fiscal illusion” in the state appa-
168. In the case of Metalclad v. Mexico, the Governor of San Luis Potosi issued a decree 
preventing the investment from operating three days before the end of his term in office. In 
the case of Abitibi Bowater v. Canada, the province of Newfoundland and Labrador expropri-
ated and refused to compensate the investor. The dispute was ultimately settled when the Ca-
nadian federal government stepped in to compensate the investor. Bertrand Marotte & John 
Ibbitson, Provinces on Hook in Future Trade Disputes: Harper, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 26, 
2010), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/provinces-on-hook-in-future-
trade-disputes-harper/article1378647/.
169. The payment of compensation (states will still have to pay compensation for 
breaching investment treaties, even if they ignore this risk in their decision-making) would 
also need to be taken into account in determining the impact on host state and investor wel-
fare. The payment of compensation, however, has no net impact on global welfare expect 
through its ex ante effects on the behavior of various actors.
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ratus,
170
and with theories of government decision-making in personalist dic-
tatorships, in which the interests of the state are thought to be indistinguish-
able from those of the self-interested ruler.
171
Relaxing the assumption that the host state fully values domestic con-
stituencies’ welfare does not affect the likelihood of opportunistic conduct 
in relation to foreign investments, as the risk of opportunism is driven by the 
host state’s desire to capture benefits for itself. In contrast, the host state’s
predicted response to new information about the investment’s impact on 
domestic constituencies—for example, social and environmental impacts—
changes markedly. A host state which undervalues its own constituencies’
welfare is substantially less likely to make inefficient changes to the domes-
tic legal regime which seek to protect these constituents at the cost of the 
foreign investor.
172
In other words, under this variation to the assumptions 
there is more likely to be under-regulation than over-regulation of invest-
ment compared to the globally efficient level. This strengthens the justifica-
tion for our proposal, which is designed to solve time inconsistency prob-
lems for the host state, not to change the way that the host state mediates 
between competing interests when responding to new information.
Let us now add an extra degree of realism and assume that the host state 
is also uncertain about the exact value of the welfare impact of the conduct 
under consideration for those constituencies—for example, because of the 
challenges in ascribing a dollar value to environmental harm to local com-
munities.
173
(The same issue arises if the host state is certain about the value 
of these impacts, but uncertain about how the tribunal will value those im-
pacts.)
174
This combination of fiscal illusion and uncertainty has serious im-
170. Blume and Rubinfeld define fiscal illusion as the assumption that the consequences 
of government decision-making “are generally discounted by the decision-making body unless 
they explicitly appear as a budgetary expense.” Lawrence Blume & Daniel Rubinfeld, Com-
pensation for Taking: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 621 (1984).
171. See, e.g., Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 567 (1993).
172. To illustrate, consider a state that is considering shutting down an investment in 
response to new information about environmental harm it causes to the local community. A 
state that fully internalizes the community’s welfare will shut the investment down once the 
value of the environmental harm exceeds the fiscal benefit to the state of allowing the invest-
ment to continue to operate. A state that is indifferent to the interests of the local community 
will never shut a revenue-generating investment down, even if the state is also indifferent to 
investor’s welfare.
173. Here, we are considering uncertainty on the part of the host government decision-
maker at the time when it decides whether to change the domestic legal regime governing the 
investment. This goes beyond the assumptions about uncertainty made in our companion pa-
per, which assumed that all parties are uncertain about the value of the external impacts of an 
investment at the time when that investment is made, but certain about the value of those im-
pacts at the time at which the host state decides whether to respond by changing the domestic 
legal regime.
174. For consideration of more complex issues arising from asymmetric information and 
uncertainty on the part of arbitral tribunals, see, e.g., Emma Aisbett, Larry S. Karp & Carol 
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plications for existing jurisprudence, insofar as liability turns on a tribunal’s
judgment about the balance the state has struck between the foreign inves-
tor’s interests and wider public interests. Given uncertainty about the value 
of costs and benefits associated with an investment to domestic constituen-
cies, a government decision-maker considering how to respond to new in-
formation will be unsure whether altering the domestic legal regime will 
trigger liability under an investment treaty. Faced with this uncertainty, a 
government decision-maker who suffers from fiscal illusion will give great-
er weight to the risk of being required to compensate the investor than to the 
expected harm to domestic constituencies. This leads the decision-maker to 
be less willing to alter the domestic legal regime than is justified from a 
global efficiency perspective creating a sort of “regulatory chill.”
175
This 
strengthens the argument for preferring our proposal to the status quo.
B. Our Proposal is Preferable from a Political Economy Perspective 
that Recognises the Possibility of Investor Lobbying and State Capture
A related concern is the interaction between investment treaties’ design 
and the political economy of investors’ influence over the host state. These 
concerns arise from an agency problem. A state is an abstract legal entity, 
whereas the government officials who enter into legal arrangements on be-
half of the state are individuals who may have private interests of their own. 
Corruption is the most extreme manifestation of this tension. For example, 
state officials may have private incentives to accept bribes in return for
granting an investor a valuable concession contract. Other manifestations 
include the susceptibility of government officials to lobbying, political do-
nations and other legal forms of influence, and the related tendency of in-
vestors to use these forms of influence to engage in rent-seeking. For exam-
ple, an investor may lobby government officials to award it a long-term 
concession contract without a competitive tender, or cultivate personal rela-
tionships with government officials to obtain confidential information about 
plans for the privatization of state assets.
176
To be sure, these concerns are 
not specific to the relationship between foreign investors and host states. 
McAusland, Police Powers, Regulatory Taking And The Efficient Compensation Of Domestic 
And Foreign Investors, 86 ECON. RECORD 367 (2010); JAN PETER SASSE, AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (U. Hamburg ed., 2011).
175. Emma Aisbett, A Welfare Economic View of International Investment Agreements, 
Address at OECD Freedom of Investment Roundtable (Oct. 17, 2015). Aisbett also makes the 
more general point that investment treaties as they are currently drafted and interpreted are 
likely to exacerbate inefficiency that results from states undervaluing the welfare of their own 
constituencies. See also Been & Beauvais, supra note 29, at 99.
176. Daniel R. Fischel & Alan Sykes, Government Liability for Breach of Contract, 1
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313, 347 (1999).
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But such allegations of impropriety are common in investment treaty arbi-
tration.
177
Before turning to the analysis of our proposal, there is an important 
threshold question: Whether foreign investments acquired through transac-
tions that are not at arm’s length are excluded from the coverage of invest-
ment treaties from the outset. Arbitral tribunals have consistently precluded 
foreign investors from invoking the protection of investment treaties if an 
investment was acquired corruptly.
178
Many tribunals have also held invest-
ment treaties do not protect investments made in clear contravention of the 
law of the host state as it stood at the time the investment was made,
179
alt-
hough jurisprudence on this point is more equivocal.
What is clear is that investments that are acquired through forms of in-
fluence that are legal or arguably legal under the law of the host state are 
entitled to the protection of investment treaties.
180
For example, in Sanum v.
Laos the investor acquired a majority stake in valuable monopoly conces-
sions to operate casinos in Laos near the border with China. The conces-
sions were acquired through a series of related agreements with the Lao 
state and a private Lao entity.
181
Information contained in the award suggests 
that the investor paid as little as $3.5 million USD for the concessions,
182
177. An example of case in which these allegations were made is Hussain Sajwani, 
Damac Park Ave. for Real Est. Dev. S.A.E. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB
/11/16, Procedural Order (Sept. 10, 2014), discussed in Jonathan Bonnitcha, Investment Trea-
ties and Transition from Authoritarian Rule 15 J. WORLD INV. TRADE 965, 982 (2014); Chris 
Hamby, Inside the Global “Club” That Helps Executives Escape their Crime, BUZZFEED 
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2016). The case ultimately settled.
178. Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 
110 (Oct. 4, 2013), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012.pdf; 
Andrea Menaker, The Determinative Impact of Fraud and Corruption on Investment Arbitra-
tions, 25 ICSID REV. 67, 69 (2010).
179. See, e.g., Vladislav Kim v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 394–404 (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw8549.pdf; Plama Consortium Ltd v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 135 (Aug. 27, 2008), 17 ICSID Rep. 659 (2016); Phoenix 
Action, Ltd v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 101 (Apr. 15, 2009), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0668.pdf; Stephan Schill, Illegal 
Investments in Investment Treaty Arbitration 11 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS & TRIBUNALS 281,
322–23 (2012); Bonnitcha, supra note 177.
180. Another example is the case of Unión Fenosa Gas, S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt. 
Here, the tribunal held that the investor was entitled to the protection of the investment treaty, 
notwithstanding the fact that it had exercised “influence. . . over senior decision-makers at the 
Ministry of Petroleum and EGPC [the Egyptian General Petroleum Company]” in procuring 
the investment contract. Unión Fenosa Gas, S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/4, Award of the Tribunal, ¶ 7.109 (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw10061.pdf.
181. Sanum Investments Ltd. v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PCA Case No. 
2013-13, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 33 (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw3322.pdf.
182. Id. ¶ 24
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plus an additional contribution to financing the development of the casi-
nos.
183
These amounts are surprisingly low, given that the casinos proved 
lucrative.
184
Laos did not allege corruption or illegality in the acquisition of 
the investment in these proceedings.
185
It did, however, draw attention to the
apparent discrepancy between the amount invested by the claimant and the 
value of rights thereby acquired, and argued that the investment should not 
be eligible for the protection of the treaty.
186
The tribunal rejected these ar-
guments on the basis that the protection of the treaty depended on the validi-
ty of the rights acquired, not the amounts involved in the transactions.
187
In 
the analysis that follows we take this position—that foreign investment is 
not automatically excluded from the protection of an investment treaty be-
cause it was acquired below market value, or through a non-arm’s length 
transaction—as given.
In this context, there are two ways in which investment treaties interact 
with the political economy of corporate influence over government deci-
sion-making.
188
First, investment treaties increase the return to rent-seeking 
behavior in the making of new investments. In the absence of an investment 
treaty, a foreign investor who obtains privatized state assets or concession 
rights through non-arm’s length transactions is vulnerable to revocation or 
renationalization. Investment treaties make rent-seeking a more attractive 
strategy by conferring legal protection on these ill-gotten gains. The second 
dynamic runs counter to the first. In the absence of an investment treaty, in-
vestors are more vulnerable to adverse conduct of the state over the lifespan 
of the investment. As such, investors have a financial incentive to cultivate 
and exercise influence over the host state to maintain the value of their in-
vestment. By conferring legal protection on foreign investment, investment 
treaties reduce the need for this ongoing rent-seeking behavior after the in-
vestment is made.
So far as we are aware, investment treaties’ impact on the prevalence of 
both forms of rent-seeking has not been investigated empirically to date. In-
stead, we consider the implications of the design of investment treaties for 
183. The latter figure was estimated at around $65 million USD by the respondent and 
as at least $85 million USD by the claimant. Id. ¶¶ 40, 140.
184. Id. ¶ 40.
185. In parallel proceedings brought by the investor’s parent company under a different 
investment treaty, Laos has subsequently alleged corruption on the part of the investor. These 
allegations have not been proven and it is unclear whether they relate to the acquisition of the 
investment. Lao Holdings N.V. v. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/6, Procedural Order No. 11 (Jun. 25, 2018), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw9767_0.pdf.
186. Sanum Investments Limited v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PCA Case No. 
2013-13, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 40, 131–136 (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.italaw.com
/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3322.pdf.
187. Id. ¶¶ 316–321
188. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 176, at 342.
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both dynamics, focusing on a comparison between our proposal and the sta-
tus quo. We use the simple example of outright expropriation as an illustra-
tion. The same tension plays out in a similar way across more complex fact 
scenarios.
Under the status quo, a foreign investor is entitled to full market value 
compensation for expropriation, even if the investment was originally ac-
quired from the state for much less than its market value. In this way exist-
ing investment treaties increase investors’ incentive to engage in rent-
seeking in the acquisition of investments, compared to the situation in which 
there is no investment treaty. In contrast, under our proposal a foreign inves-
tor’s entitlement to compensation for expropriation is, at most, the price 
originally paid for the investment. An investor that uses influence over gov-
ernment officials to obtain a state’s assets below their market value will find 
that its entitlement to compensation in the event of subsequent renationali-
zation of those assets is also reduced. (One situation in which this fact pat-
tern arises is when there is a transition from an authoritarian to a more dem-
ocratic regime in a state, and the incoming regime seeks to recover assets 
transferred to cronies of the former regime.)
189
As such, our proposal does 
not substantially increase investors’ incentive to engage in rent-seeking be-
havior in the acquisition of investments, compared to the situation in which 
there is no investment treaty.
By guaranteeing some compensation for expropriation, our proposal al-
so reduces investors’ incentive to engage in rent-seeking throughout the 
lifespan of the investment, compared to the situation in which there is no 
investment treaty. However, because compensation under our proposal is 
inevitably less than the expected value of the unexpropriated investment to 
the investor, there remains some incentive to engage in ongoing rent-
seeking. In contrast, the status quo eliminates investors’ incentive to engage 
in rent-seeking throughout the lifespan of the investment, because any ex-
propriation must be accompanied by compensation equivalent to the ex-
pected value of the investment.
Although both forms of rent-seeking behavior are socially wasteful and 
undermine domestic investment governance, there are good reasons to de-
sign legal rules to minimize investors’ incentive to engage in the former, ra-
ther than the latter. Following Fischel and Sykes, our argument is based on 
the uncertainties of government decision-making within host states.
190
Where the benefits of rent-seeking behavior are more certain, we should ex-
pect rational investors to engage in such behavior. Rent-seeking relating to 
the acquisition of investment involves a single time-period.  Under invest-
ment treaties as they are currently drafted, once an investment is acquired 
through a non-arm’s length transaction the benefits of such behavior are se-
cured for the duration of the investment. This creates an incentive for large 
189. Bonnitcha, supra note 177, at 985.
190. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 176, at 343.
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expenditures on rent-seeking. In contrast, an investor considering engaging 
in rent-seeking throughout the lifespan of an investment is always vulnera-
ble to a change of government or public sentiment at a subsequent date. (In-
deed, it may be that investors who are perceived to have benefited from co-
zy relationships with government officials are more vulnerable to backlash 
in the medium term.) The inherent uncertainty about the effectiveness of 
ongoing rent-seeking as a strategy reduces the benefit to investors of engag-
ing in it, even in the absence of an investment treaty.  For this reason, fur-
ther reducing the incentive for investors to engage in such behavior should 
not be a primary consideration in the design of investment treaties’ substan-
tive protections. Instead, our proposal should be preferred to the status quo 
because it does not create incentives for investors to engage in rent-seeking 
in the acquisition of investments.
C. Our Proposal is Preferable from a Democratic Perspective
Investment treaties constrain the conduct of the state. This inevitably 
raises questions about their interaction with democratic decision-making.
191
To be sure, not every state that is bound by an investment treaty is a democ-
racy.
192
But investment treaty claims against democracies are far more 
common than the investment treaties’ proponents seem to assume.
193
Under-
standing investment treaties’ interaction with democratic decision-making 
also has at least some relevance to wider questions about their relationship 
with responsive governance in non-democratic states or state that are only 
partially democratic.
194
Concerns about investment treaties’ intersection with democracy have 
two dimensions. The first concerns the process by which the treaties were 
adopted, including whether the content of the treaties was understood by the 
191. Martti Koskenniemi, It’s Not the Cases. It’s the System.: M. Sornarajah, Resistance 
and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment, 18 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE
343, 347 (2017) (characterizing investment treaties as embodying a particular set of beliefs 
about the relationship between democracy and economic governance); see also Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 157, at 1702 (suggesting that the central challenge in designing consti-
tutional principles that protect private property from adverse government action is “to recon-
cile an unpredictable, democratically responsible polity with the existence of a capitalist 
economy based on private property and individual initiative.”).
192. See José E. Alvarez, Review: Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law by Gus 
van Harten, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 909 (2008).
193. For example, Jan Paulsson has written that “a country governed in accordance with 
the rule of law has little to fear from BITs.” Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dis-
pute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV. 339, 347 (2010). But, in important empirical work, Williams 
shows that democracies are more likely to be subject to claims under investment treaties than 
non-democratic states even after controlling for other variables, such as inbound FDI stock. 
See Zoe Philipps Williams, Risky Business or Risky Politics: What Explains Investor–State 
Disputes? (2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, Hertie School of Governance) (on file with author).
194. For example, in non-democratic states some agencies of government may neverthe-
less be sensitive to public opinion.
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public and whether the treaties were subject to appropriate parliamentary 
scrutiny. Up until at least the end of the 1990s, most investment treaties 
were adopted with minimal parliamentary scrutiny or public debate.
195
 In-
deed, in many developing countries even those who negotiated investment 
treaties did not fully appreciate their legal implications.
196
 The majority of 
investment treaties in existence today date from this period. The lack of 
democratic deliberation in their negotiation is not an argument in favor of 
our proposal specifically, but it does raise questions about the democratic 
legitimacy of the status quo.
197
 
Since the explosion of arbitrations in the mid-2000s, investment treaty-
making has been subject to greater public scrutiny. For example, the U.S. 
held public consultations prior to the revision of its model BIT in 2004. 
Likewise, in 2014 the European Commission conducted public consulta-
tions on the inclusion of investment provisions in the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership. Investment treaties have also been discussed 
extensively in the European Parliament.
198
 
Following a controversial challenge to its black economic empower-
ment policies, South Africa launched a three year review of its investment 
policy regime, leading to a cabinet decision to terminate its entire stock of 
investment treaties.
199
 Many other states have been reconsidering their ap-
proach to investment treaties, including Australia, Colombia, India, Indone-
sia, Morocco and Nigeria.
200
 Two observations can be made about this trend 
to wider public deliberation and debate about investment treaties in recent 
years: first, almost all such processes of deliberation have resulted in rec-
ommendations for change of the status quo and, second, that such changes 
range from minor reform (in the case of the 2004 U.S. model BIT) to total 
exit from the existing regime (in the case of South Africa). The picture that 
emerges is not one of consensus between states on the desirability of the sta-
tus quo, rather it is one of uncertainty and disagreement about the distribu-
tion of costs and benefits of existing investment treaties. 
In this context, there is a strong democratic justification for our choice 
of the Pareto criterion as the primary basis for evaluation of investment trea-
 
 195. LAUGE POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: THE 
POLITICS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 14–15 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2015). 
 196. See id. 
 197. MONTT, supra note 36, at 141–44. See also Been & Beauvais, supra note 29, at 
137–38. 
 198. E.g., European Union, Council Regulation No. 912/204, Recital 4., 2014 O.J. 
(L257) 21. The EU is now proposing a new Multilateral Investment Court to replace ad hoc 
arbitration of investment treaty disputes. We discuss the relationship between our proposal 
and these developments infra Part VI. 
 199. Mohammed Mossallam, Process Matters: South Africa’s Experience Exiting its 
BITs 3 (GEG, Working Paper No. 2015/97, 2015). 
 200. Morosini & Sanchez Badin, supra note 22. 
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ties’ provision. A minimum requirement for a democratic state to enter into 
treaties should be that the treaty increases national welfare.
201
This limits the 
range of possible treaties between democracies to those that improve the 
welfare of all state parties—i.e. the Pareto criterion. Our companion paper 
shows that, unlike alternatives that approximate the level of protection cur-
rently provided by investment treaties, our proposal meets this criterion.
The second dimension of investment treaties’ intersection with democ-
racy relates to the constraints the treaties place on host states once in 
force.
202
Investment treaties allow foreign investors to demand compensa-
tion for new legislation passed by democratically elected parliaments and 
for exercise of administrative power that elected officials validly delegate to 
agencies.
203
It is no defense for a host to argue that it enacted the measure in 
question according to a democratic process.
In this simple sense, investment treaties clearly constrain democratic 
decision-making in the states that are bound by them. (The same could be 
said of any international treaty backed by a binding dispute settlement sys-
tem.) The extent of this constraint depends on the extent of protection from 
legal and policy change that the treaties give to foreign investors. Our pro-
posal places a lesser constraint on states than the status quo, both because 
much government conduct for which compensation is currently required 
would not be compensable under our proposal and because, insofar as com-
pensation is required under our proposal, the amount would generally be 
less than is the case under the status quo.
But there is another, more precise, sense in which investment treaties 
constrain democratic decision-making. An essential characteristic of demo-
cratic governance is reversibility.
204
A government may adopt particular 
laws and policies. If members of the public oppose those laws and policies, 
they are entitled to campaign against them. If enough members of the public 
agree, a new government may be elected on a platform to alter what previ-
ously may have been regarded as settled. This basic process of contestation 
and revision of the domestic legal regime is a normal and healthy part of the 
democratic process. It is reflected in the foundational constitutional princi-
201. Similarly, Kurtz, arguing that treaties are legitimate from a democratic perspective 
if adopted through democratic processes and necessary to achieve instrumental benefits aris-
ing from international cooperation. Jürgen Kurtz, Building Legitimacy Through Interpretation 
in Investor-State Arbitration: On Consistency, Coherence, and the Identification of Applicable 
Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO 
PRACTICE 257 (Zachery Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn, & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2014).
202. DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE (2008); MONTT, supra note 36, at 169–77.
203. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 1, at 235.
204. David Schneiderman, Against Constitutional Excess: Tocquevillian Reflections on 
International Investment Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 585 (2018).
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ple that “one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its succes-
sors.”
205
Investment treaties, as they are currently drafted and interpreted, im-
pose significant constraints on this process of democratic contestation. 
These constraints are most obvious in the protection of foreign investors’
legitimate expectations—expectations that a state will continue to act con-
sistently with assurances, policies, and laws in place when an investment 
was made for the entire lifespan of the investment.
206
In contrast, our pro-
posal does not require compensation for a change in political priorities as 
such, which fall within our conception of new information. A host state is 
only liable if it has gained from not having had the new domestic legal re-
gime in place from the outset, and the most it could be required to pay in 
compensation is the value of the gain. In other words, under our proposal 
the host state cannot end up worse off than if it had had the new legal re-
gime in place from the outset. While there are still consequences for legal 
and policy shifts under our proposal, it does not constrain democratic choice 
in the sense that it doesn’t penalize a state for legal and policy reversals.
To illustrate, consider an example where a state approves an investor’s
mining project in a national park. The state is aware that the project will
have a negative environmental impact but decides that the economic devel-
opment flowing from the proposal will outweigh this impact. An opposition 
party opposes this decision on the grounds that the project’s environmental 
impact outweighs its economic benefits. It campaigns on the platform of in-
troducing a moratorium on mining in the national park, wins the election 
and cancels the project. Under the status quo, this policy reversal triggers a 
requirement to pay compensation equal to the expected value of the mine 
had it been allowed to continue operation. Under our proposal, the state 
cannot be left worse off than if it had had the moratorium in place from the 
outset; at most, it will have to refund any gain it has made from allowing the 
project, such as the price for which it sold the concession to the investor.
VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR PROPOSAL AND DISCUSSIONS IN
UNCITRAL WORKING GROUP III ON INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT REFORM
In the foregoing sections, we have made the case for a new approach to 
liability and compensation under investment treaties. This leaves the ques-
tion of how our proposal could be implemented as a practical matter. As we 
have explained,
207
existing principles governing liability and compensation 
205. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996). This is sometimes called 
the rule against entrenchment. For discussion, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legis-
lative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002).
206. For further discussion, see supra Section IV.a.1.
207. See supra Section IV.a.
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under investment treaties emerge from the combination of the treaties’ ex-
press provisions and the accretion of arbitral jurisprudence relating to the 
interpretation of those provisions. In theory, some aspects of our proposal 
could be implemented in a decentralized way by arbitral tribunals them-
selves, through shifts in the interpretation of existing treaty provisions. For 
example, tribunals might reconsider the justifications for protecting inves-
tors’ expectations under the FET standard, or for awarding investors com-
pensation based on projections decades into the future of the income that an 
investment project would have earned. However, arbitral tribunals’ practice 
of relying on the decisions of past tribunals as authority mean that signifi-
cant shifts in jurisprudence are unlikely in the absence of state interven-
tion.
208
 And other aspects of our proposal—notably, the integration of 
gained-based considerations into the assessment of compensation—could 
only be implemented through the amendment of existing investment trea-
ties.
209
 Many states are currently reconsidering their existing treaty practice. 
In this context, our proposal provides a basis for the amendment of existing 
treaties and for the negotiation and drafting of new investment treaties in the 
future. 
Our proposal also has implications for the multilateral discussions about 
the reform of investment treaties’ investor-state dispute mechanism current-
ly underway in UNCITRAL Working Group III.
210
 The UNCITRAL Work-
ing Group’s mandate was originally defined narrowly, to prevent disagree-
ments about the substantive content of investment treaties from derailing 
attempts to find agreement on reform of the arbitration process.
211
 The EU’s 
 
 208. Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The 
Dual Role of States 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 190 (2010). For an empirical analysis, see Wolf-
gang Alschner, Ensuring Correctness or Promoting Consistency? Tracking Policy Priorities 
in Investment Arbitration Through Large-Scale Citation Analysis, in EMPIRICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 1 (Daniel Behn, Ole Kristian Fauchald & Mal-
colm Langford eds., 2019). 
 209. See Roberts, supra note 208 (arguing that states have the power to amend treaties, 
including to the detriment of investors). 
 210. For commentary on the process, see Anthea Roberts, Blog of the European Journal 
of International Law, EJIL: TALK!, https://www.ejiltalk.org/author/aroberts/ (last visited Mar. 
25, 2021). 
 211. In 2017, the Working Group agreed to proceed with its work in three stages, “(i) 
first, identify and consider concerns regarding ISDS; (ii) second, consider whether reform was 
desirable in light of any identified concerns; and (iii) third, if the Working Group were to con-
clude that reform was desirable, develop any relevant solutions to be recommended to the 
Commission.” U.N. Comm’n on Int’l L. & Trade, Rep. of Working Group III (Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930
/Rev.1 3 (Dec. 19, 2017). 
In 2018, the Working Group stated the concerns which had identified, which were group 
under three headings: 
A. Concerns pertaining to the lack of consistency, coherence, predictability and 
correctness of arbitral decisions by ISDS tribunals 
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proposal to establish a new multilateral investment court has been a focal 
point for these debates about reform of the ISDS mechanism.
212
The original definition of the Working Group’s mandate overlooks the 
many ways in which procedural concerns relating to ISDS as an adjudica-
tive mechanism and substantive concerns relating to the liability and com-
pensation under investment treaties are intertwined. Consider, for example, 
the EU’s proposal for a multilateral investment court. The decisions of such 
a court would have greater legitimacy than those rendered by arbitral tribu-
nals; doctrinal principles established or endorsed by such a court would then 
be difficult to revisit. The potential for a multilateral investment court to en-
dorse and legitimize existing jurisprudence on compensation and damages is 
particularly concerning. Existing principles governing damages under in-
vestment treaties are largely a creation of arbitral doctrine. If debate about 
compensation and damages under investment treaties were deferred until 
after the conclusion of the UNCITRAL process, there is a real risk that a 
newly created multilateral investment court will already have “locked in”
the existing approach to damages.
In response to these concerns, several states have argued for a broaden-
ing of the Working Group’s mandate.
213
In particular, in the October 2019 
session, both Nigeria and Pakistan argued successfully for the addition of 
compensation and damages under investment treaties to the Working 
Group’s agenda as a “cross-cutting” issue.
214
Our proposal speaks directly to 
B. Concerns pertaining to arbitrators and decision makers
C. Concerns pertaining to cost and duration of ISDS cases
See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l L. & Trade, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/964 6, 11, 16 
(Nov. 6, 2018).
This framing has then been reflected in the questions addressed by the academic working 
group. For criticism, see Open Letter on the Asymmetry of ISDS, ERASMUS INST. PUB.
KNOWLEDGE, https://www.eur.nl/en/news/erasmus-institute-public-knowledge (last visited 
Jun. 25, 2020).
212. Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State 
Arbitration 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 410 (2018). For the substance of the EU proposal, see gener-
ally U.N. Comm’n. on Int’l Trade L., Report of Working Group III on its Thirty-Seventh Ses-
sion, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.159/Add.1 (Jan. 18, 2019), https://trade.ec.europa.eu
/doclib/docs/2019/january/tradoc_157631.pdf.
213. Anthea Roberts & Taylor St. John, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: Visualising a 
Flexible Framework, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-
reform-visualising-a-flexible-framework/ (citing the submissions by Indonesia, Bahrain, Thai-
land, South Africa and various NGOs).
214. On Pakistan and Nigeria’s intervention, see Anthea Roberts & Taylor St. John, 
UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: In Sickness and In Health, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 23, 2019), https:
//www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reform-in-sickness-and-in-health/. On the revised agenda, 
see U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Set-
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the issue, and provides a principled approach to addressing concerns about 
out-size awards under existing jurisprudence. As of mid-2020, the Working 
Group is considering modalities for reform, with attention being given to the 
possibility of a multilateral instrument containing a menu of various reform 
options. States that became party to such an instrument could then give their 
consent to “opt in” to specific reforms.
215
 If two states “opt in” to the same 
reforms, the effect would be to amend any bilateral investment treaty be-
tween those states to incorporate the reform in question. In this way, a mul-
tilateral instrument can avoid the practical problems that would arise from 
states having to negotiate the amendment of thousands of investment trea-
ties one-by-one, while accommodating the fact that different states may be 
inclined to move at different speeds on different reform options. Such a 
multilateral instrument could include substantive reforms to the content of 
underlying investment treaties, as well as reforms to the ISDS process.
216
 
Our proposal is well-suited to inclusion in such an instrument, particularly 
insofar as it addresses the principles governing compensation and damages 
under investment treaties. The multilateral instrument that will likely 
emerge from the UNCITRAL Working Group is the most promising means 
by which our proposal could be implemented in practice. 
To facilitate the inclusion of our proposal, insofar as it relates to the 
principles governing compensation and damages, in such a multilateral in-
strument it is important to translate it into legal text that is as prescriptive as 
possible, to reduce the risk of misunderstanding by tribunals that may not 
appreciate the underlying economic and policy rationales for our approach. 
With this in mind, we propose the following text: 
 
(1) To determine the amount of compensation due for expropriation or for 
any other measure(s) that breach(es) this treaty, the tribunal shall first 
determine whether, if the measure(s) had been in place immediately 
prior to the time at which the investor made its investment, the investor 
would, nevertheless, have made the investment: 
a. To determine whether the investor would have made the in-
vestment, the tribunal shall consider objective rather than sub-
jective factors. In particular, the tribunal shall base its decision 
on whether, if the measure(s) had been in place immediately 
 
tlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc A/CN.9/1004* (Oct. 23, 
2019). 
 215. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Set-
tlement (ISDS) Multilateral Instrument on ISDS Reform: Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc A
/CN.9/WG.III/WP.194, ¶¶ 8–9 (Jan. 16, 2020). For academic discussion, see Wolfgang 
Alschner, The OECD Multilateral Tax Instrument: A Model for Reforming The International 
Investment Regime?, 45 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1 (2019); Stephan W. Schill & Geraldo Vidigal, 
Designing Investment Dispute Settlement à la Carte: Insights from Comparative Institutional 
Design Analysis, 18 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 314 (2019). 
 216. Roberts & St. John, supra note 214. 
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prior to the time at which the investor made its investment (but 
if the situation in all other respects, including information 
about the likelihood of future contingencies, was the same as 
that facing the investor immediately prior to making its in-
vestment), the investment would, nevertheless, have been ex-
pected to generate a positive net return. 
b. In the case of measure(s) amounting to expropriation of an in-
vestment, a tribunal shall conclude that the investor would not 
have made the investment if the measure(s) had been in place 
immediately prior to the time at which the investor made its in-
vestment, unless the host state proves otherwise. 
(2) If the tribunal determines that the investor would have made the in-
vestment, then no compensation is due to the investor. 
(3) If the tribunal determines that the investor would not have made the 
investment, then the tribunal shall award the lesser of the following 
amounts as compensation to the investor: 
a. The value of the loss the investor has suffered, as com-
pared to the situation the investor would have been in if it 
had not made the investment; and 
b. The value of the gain the host state has obtained, as com-
pared to the situation the host state would have been in if 
the investor had not made the investment. 
i. In assessing the value of 3(b) the tribunal shall take in-
to account any payment the investor has made to the 
host state to acquire the investment, any physical as-
sets owned by the investor that have been transferred 
into state ownership and any genuinely additive eco-
nomic contribution of the investment to the host state’s 
economy—for example, through the payment of wages 
to employees in the host state at a higher rate than the 
wages those employees would have earned if the in-
vestment had not been made. In assessing the value of 
3(b) the tribunal shall deduct the value of any damage 
caused by the investment’s operation to the host state. 
By implication of the above, when either amount 3(a) or 3(b) is 
zero, compensation shall be zero. 
This language could also be incorporated into new treaties and into existing 
treaties by way of an agreement to amend the treaty among the parties to it. 
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VII. CONCLUSION
Investment treaties are highly unusual instruments of international law. 
They provide a particular class of private actors—foreign investors—with 
internationalized legal protection from state conduct, as well as a procedural 
mechanism to enforce these rights. No other regime of international law 
provides analogous protection to private actors.
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The existence and design 
of these special privileges for foreign investors must be carefully justified. 
In a companion paper we argue that, while there is an underlying economic 
rationale for investment treaties, that rationale is more limited than lawyers 
seem to assume. Investment treaties should seek to solve problems of time 
inconsistency for the host state but should not seek to constrain the way that 
states respond to new information. In this article, we explored the implica-
tions of this insight for the extent of substantive protection and the princi-
ples governing compensation under investment treaties.
We proposed that investment treaties should be redrafted so that:
i. A state should only face the possibility of having to com-
pensate a foreign investor if the host state breaches or 
modifies the domestic legal regime governing the invest-
ment, and
ii. Compensation should be the lesser of the investor’s loss 
and the host state’s gain from the host state not having had 
the new domestic legal regime in place when the invest-
ment was made. (When one or other of these values is ze-
ro, no compensation is required.)
In Part VI, we propose more detailed draft treaty text that explains how 
compensation under the second limb of this proposal should be determined 
in a step-by-step manner.
Key practical implications of our proposal are that states should not be 
required to compensate investors in many of the circumstances that are 
compensable under existing investment treaty jurisprudence and that, inso-
far as compensation is required, the amount of compensation will ordinarily 
be less than is currently the case. Another distinguishing feature of our pro-
posal is that it does not require arbitral tribunals to weigh or balance com-
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peting interests in order to determine whether compensation is required or, 
insofar as compensation is required, to determine the amount that should be 
paid.
In Part III, we showed that this proposal builds on a line of scholarship 
that distinguishes government use (or acquisition, or appropriation) of prop-
erty from government regulation of private property. In Part IV we ex-
plained how our proposal resolves previous attempts to develop jurispru-
dence based on the use/regulation distinction. Part IV also argued that, by 
eschewing the use of balancing techniques to determine whether the host 
state has breached an investment treaty, our proposal solves many of the 
practical problems with existing jurisprudence relating to the interpretation 
and application of investment treaties. Taken together, Parts III and IV illus-
trate that our proposal is feasible and that it relies on information and legal 
techniques that are available and familiar to arbitral tribunals.
Part V explored some of the wider policy arguments in favor of our 
proposal. We showed that the ability of our proposal to generate welfare 
benefits for both host and home states is robust to realistic variations in as-
sumptions about government decision-making. We also considered the risk 
of more serious pathologies in government decision-making, such as sus-
ceptibility to lobbying and capture by foreign investors. Finally, we argued 
that there are strong democratic arguments for preferring our proposal to the 
status quo. Taken together, the arguments in Part V strengthen our central 
claim that our proposal is superior to the status quo.
Part VI considered the implementation of our proposal as a practical 
matter and, in particular, the relationship between our proposal and the mul-
tilateral discussion on reform of the investment treaty regime currently un-
derway in UNCITRAL Working Group III. In 2019, concerns about com-
pensation and damages under investment treaties were added to the 
Working Group’s agenda, demonstrating that reform in this area is a high 
priority for states. As to the modalities of reform, the Working Group is 
considering a multilateral instrument that would include a menu of proce-
dural and substantive reforms. States that become party to such an instru-
ment could then give their consent to “opt in” to specific reforms. Our pro-
posal is well-suited to inclusion in such an instrument.
